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INTRODUCTION
The number of stepfamilies in the United States has increased dra-
matically in conjunction with a rising rate of marriage dissolution and
remarriage.' The term stepfamily means a family household consisting
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1970, LeMoyne College; J.D. 1974,
University of Michigan. The author acknowledges the research assistance of Barbara Fure.
She also expresses gratitude to LuAnn Driscoll, who supervised preparation of the
manuscript.
1 Divorce and remarriage in this country are sizeable and growing phenomena.
From 1970 to 1977 the divorce rate in America increased dramatically by
79%. It is projected that over one-third of married people who are now be-
tween the ages of 25 and 35 will divorce. Each of these divorces will involve
an estimated average of two children. Eighty percent of divorced adults re-
marry, and 60% of remarriages involve at least one child. Currently, 13% of
the nation's children under age 18 are living in a stepfamily.
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of a married couple and children who are the natural or adopted chil-
dren of only one spouse.2 Family law does not presently provide clear
and comprehensive rules to define the rights and responsibilities of par-
ties to the stepparent-child relationship. This Article seeks to provide a
basis for correcting that deficiency, by surveying the current law, noting
the inadequacy of many existing rules, and proposing a formulation of
rights and responsibilities based on policy concerns. The Article focuses
on the support and custody aspects of the relationship between steppar-
ent and child.
The natural parent-child status entails many well-defined legal
consequences and serves as a logical model for formulating a definition
of the stepparent-child status. Courts, and occasionally legislatures,
have considered extending the legal aspects of the natural parent-child
relationship to the stepfamily context, but only in an ad hoc fashion
with inconsistent results among issues and jurisdictions. 3 Family law
seeks to protect family members, especially children, interested third
parties, and the state, by clearly defining important personal relation-
ships. As family life becomes more diverse, and expectations that all
families will conform to a single model erode, the law must create new
rules to accomplish the goals of clarity and protection.4 Given the large
number of people currently living in stepfamilies,5 lawmakers should
carefully evaluate and address this aspect of modern family life.
6
OFFICE OF HUMAN DEv. SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HELPING
YOUTH AND FAMILIES OF SEPARATION, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE 3 (1980).
2 "Such families have been given many names, such as the extended family, stepfamily,
blended family, reconstituted family, meta family, and conjugal continuation." M. HYDE,
MY FRIEND HAS FOUR PARENTS 1 (1981). The marriage of a parent with custody of minor
children born out of wedlock also creates a stepfamily. The definition excludes family rela-
tionships created by stepparent adoption of the children or by marriage of the noncustodial
natural parent. If natural parents share joint custody of their children and each marries
someone else, the children may become members of two stepfamilies pursuant to this
definition.
3 See Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship.- Cinderella Revisited, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 209, 209 (1970); The Step Relationship andlts Legal Status, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 259, 269-
80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Step Relationship]; Note, Stepchildren and In Loco Parentis Rela-
tionships, 52 HARV. L. REV. 515, 518-21 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Note].
Disciplines other than law have been criticized for paying little attention to stepfamilies.
See, e.g., B. MADDOX, THE HALF-PARENT 2 (1975) (suggesting that reasons for inattention by
social sciences include painful aspects for family members of discussing subject and inaccessi-
bility of stepfamilies to outsiders).
4 Lawmakers are presently performing this function in response to the increasing inci-
dence of unmarried cohabitation. See generaly, e.g., Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage.- A
Dijerent Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1125 (1981) (discussing legal treatment of claims by
cohabitors against third parties and state); Note, Bfyond Marvin: A Proposalfor Quasi-Spousal
Support, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359 (1978) (discussing legally enforceable economic relationship
between cohabitors).
5 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6 Professor Lenore Weitzman has pointed out that the assumption underlying many
family laws, that every marriage is a first marriage, no longer conforms to the reality of many
people's lives. L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 153-67 (1981). She has proposed
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Current law fails to provide certainty and protection regarding the
custody and support aspects of steprelationships. Legislatures have ig-
nored the issues of stepchild custody and visitation following termina-
tion of the stepmarriage by death or divorce. Without legislative
authorization, courts have been reluctant to assume jurisdiction. In the
area of stepparent support during marriage, legislatures in many states
have limited their attention to needy stepchildren. Limited equitable
doctrines and legislation outside the United States provide the only cur-
rent authority for continuing support following marriage termination.
Thus, laws regulating the stepfamily generally ignore de facto economic
and emotional bonds, with harsh results for family members in some
cases. The need exists for laws that clearly establish stepparent support
duties during marriage, and the jurisdiction of the courts over stepchil-
dren at the time of stepmarriage termination to order continuing step-
parent support, custody, or visitation in appropriate cases. Lawmakers




Parental obligations to provide financial support for minor children
are an essential part of the family laws. This principle was recognized as
a moral obligation even before it was embodied in law.7 In Blackstone's
words:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a
principle of natural law; an obligation. . . laid on them not only by
nature itself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the
world: for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their
issue, if they only gave their children life, that they might afterwards
see them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into
a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life
which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. 8
Support obligations within the nuclear family are an efficient
mechanism whereby society assures the economic well-being of its mem-
bers. Imposing duties on the parents who caused the entry of a depen-
dent child into the world is reasonable, and places responsibility with
those who voluntarily assume it in most cases. Although child support
that the law allow marriage partners to write the terms of their own marriage contract in
order to vary the terms imposed by law. Id. at 238. Regarding issues affecting children over
which the state retains final authority, and for families without contracts, however, the law of
stepfamilies must be clarified.
7 See H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIvE 3 (1981);
Foster, Freed & Midonick, Child Support: The Quick and the Dead, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1157,
1157-59 (1975).
81 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447.
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obligations historically were imposed primarily on fathers,9 recent con-
stitutional developments in the area of gender-based discrimination,' 0
along with statutory reform of family laws in many jurisdictions,I' have
produced a trend toward gender neutral support duties.12 Modern sup-
port obligations are thus imposed upon both parents, whether or not
they are married to one another.13 Parents remain obligated to support
the children of their marriage after divorce. When one parent dies, the
other's duty to the minor children survives. The parent's obligation
ends only at the child's death, emancipation, age of majority, or upon
termination of the parent-child relationship by the state.
When one natural parent marries a nonparent, the question arises
whether the new spouse should become financially responsible for the
child. The first two sections of this part explore the answers offered by
the common law doctrine of in loco parentis14 and by statute in some
jurisdictions.' 5 Later sections present proposals for assigning stepparents
greater duties during marriage, and for balancing concurrent stepparent
and natural parent obligations.16 This part concludes by examining the
existing law regarding stepparent support following marriage termina-
tion, the merits of imposing continuing obligations in appropriate cases,
and suggestions for formulating a post-divorce stepparent support law. 1
7
A. In Loco Parentis
At common law, marriage alone does not obligate the stepparent to
support stepchildren. Absent an agreement or circumstances to the con-
trary, however, accepting a stepchild into the marital home creates an
assumption that the stepparent is in loco parentis. The stepparent who
voluntarily assumes financial responsibility stands "in the place of the
9 H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 187-88 (1968).
10 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979) (husbands-only alimony obligations
violate equal protection clause).
I I See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 196 (West 1982) (both parents have equal duty to sup-
port); Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 7, at 1169 ("The desexing of. . . child support
and a regard for equal protection principles is a marked characteristic of most recent divorce
reform.').
12 H. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 4-7. Butsee Dill v. Dill, 232 Ga. 231, 206 S.E.2d 6 (1974)
(upholding constitutionality of statute imposing primary child support obligations on father).
13 In Pickett v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1983), the Supreme Court expanded the
rights of children born outside of marriage by holding that a two-year statute of limitations
on paternity and support actions for such children violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.
14 See in/a part I.A.
15 See in/ia part I.B.
16 See in/ia parts I.C., D.
17 See in/a parts I.E & I.F. In community property states, even if no independent duty of
stepparent support is imposed, the stepparent's earnings may be reachable to the extent of the
natural parent's community property interest therein. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 99
Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979) (discussed in Comment, Cinderella Revisited, 10
SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 103, 104-08 (1982)).
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parent" with regard to the matter of support. 18
The common law imposes no duties beyond those voluntarily as-
sumed by the stepparent. The stepparent may manifest the requisite
intent to assume responsibility by actually providing financial support
or by taking over custodial duties. 19 The types of evidence upon which
courts have relied to determine financial responsibility include the per-
formance of household services for the child, counseling by the steppar-
ent, and payment of the child's expenses.20 Neither adoption of the
stepparent's surname by the child nor the presence or absence of the
other natural parent affects the determination.
2 '
The stepparent may terminate the in loco parentis relationship and
its corresponding financial responsibility at will.22  Even express
promises to provide future support will not bind an adult who subse-
quently chooses to abandon the responsibility.2 3 The stepparent may
indicate an intention to terminate the in loco parentis relationship by
behavior inconsistent with such a status. The stepparent may, for exam-
ple, physically remove the child from the marital home or enter into a
written agreement with the natural parent disavowing responsibility for
the child's support. Stepparents choose to terminate the in loco parentis
relationship most frequently at the time of divorce.
2 4
In general, only third parties, including creditors and the state, can
enforce the in loco parentis support obligation. 25 Direct enforcement by
18 See Hails, In Loco Parentis and the Relevant Child, 2 ORANGE CouNTY B.J. 712, 713-18
(1975). The law regards the adult standing in loco parentis as the legal parent for purposes
other than support. The law does not, however, attach all of the incidents of the natural
parent-child relationship to such an adult. See Berkowitz, supra note 3, at 212-27; Step Relation-
ship, supra note 3, at 270-80; Note, supra note 3.
19 See, e.g., Hush v. Devilbliss Co., 77 Mich. App. 639, 649, 259 N.W.2d 170, 174-75
(1977) (holding that grandmother's assumption of daily infant care placed her in loco
parentis).
20 See, e.g., Loomis v. State, 228 Cal. App. 2d 820, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1964) (stepmother
who provided financial support, performance of household duties, discipline, and advice
stood in loco parentis).
21 See Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 605, 157 N.W.2d 660, 663-64 (1968); McManus
v. Hinney, 35 Wis. 2d 433, 151 N.W.2d 44 (1967); Hails, supra note 18, at 714.
22 H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 189.
23 Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 230-31, 495 P.2d 618, 623 (1972) (promises made
by husband during marital separation held not binding at time of divorce). The child in
Sargeant was not a stepchild but rather the son of the wife's niece. Although the stepfamily
constitutes the most common situation, the in loco parentis doctrine extends to all circum-
stances where a voluntary de facto parent-child relationship is established.
24 See infra part I.E (regarding support following marriage termination).
25 For example, creditors have relied on the in loco parentis doctrine to recover from
stepparents for necessary support items provided to stepchildren. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lieber-
man, 160 Misc. 310, 289 N.Y.S. 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (dentist could recover from stepfa-
ther for services provided to child if in fact stepfather was in loco parentis), rev'g in part 157
Misc. 2d 844, 284 N.Y.S. 970 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1936) (dentist entitled to payment as matter of
law). Similarly, the state may seek to recover from stepparents public funds provided for
child support. See Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa) (state grant
terminated after inclusion of stepfather's income), appeal dismissed mem., 409 U.S. 813 (1972).
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the stepchild is unavailable, because the stepparent may terminate the
in loco parentis relationship at will.26 The in loco parentis doctrine thus
imposes the support duty only at times when a legal obligation is not
necessary to guarantee support, and fails to meet the goals of providing
protection and certainty for stepchildren.
B. Stepparent Support Statutes
Legislatures in a number of jurisdictions have addressed the issue of
stepparent support during marriage, but the current statutes are gener-
ally of limited scope. Some statutes simply codify the in loco parentis
doctrine. For example, a Montana statute provides:
A married person is not bound to support his spouse's children by a
former marriage; but if he receives them into his family and supports
them, it is presumed that he does so as a parent and, where such is the
case, they are not liable to him for their support nor he to them for
their services.2
7
Other limited statutory approaches include the extension of family ex-
pense laws28 and criminal nonsupport laws29 to stepchildren.
Legislation in several states imposes liability upon stepparents only
for stepchildren who are, or are likely to become, recipients of public
assistance.30 Some statutes provide for direct suit by welfare authorities
against the stepparent. 31 A Hawaiian statute combines the voluntary
aspect of common law support doctrine with a needy child limitation,
extending liability only to "a step-parent who acts in loco parentis...
Natural parents are another category of third parties who may rely on the in loco parentis
doctrine to reduce their own child support obligations. See in/a text accompanying notes 65-
79.
26 Even within an ongoing family, where the parents cannot terminate their support
duty at will, a child can enforce this obligation only in extreme circumstances. See in/ra text
accompanying note 64 (discussing reluctance of courts to become involved in financial affairs
of ongoing families). Although the stepchildren may not enforce the in loco parentis duty to
provide support, the doctrine does prevent the stepparent from seeking recovery from the
child for support voluntarily rendered. For example, the Oklahoma statute, which codifies
the in loco parentis doctrine, provides:
A husband is not bound to maintain his wife's children by a former husband;
but if he receives them into his family and supports them, it is presumed that
he does so as a parent, and where such is the case, they are not liable to him
for their support, nor he to them for their services.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 15 (West 1966).
27 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (1983); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 15 (West 1966).
28 See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (Supp.
1984-85).
29 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.20.030 (Supp.
1983-84).
30 See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-4 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.310 (Baldwin
1981); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 101.1 (McKinney 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.195 (West
Supp. 1983-1984).
31 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 101.2 (McKinney 1976).
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if the legal parents desert the child or are unable to support the child,
thereby reducing the child to destitute and necessitous circumstances.
'32
Limited duty statutes have created problems for welfare authorities
in a number of states.33 States commonly assume the availability of
stepparent resources for child support in determining eligibility and
level of need under the federally assisted aid to families with dependent
children program. A federal regulation, with which state welfare plans
must comply in order to receive federal funds, provides that the state
may assume stepparent support only if the stepparent is "legally obli-
gated to support the child under State law of general applicability
which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent
that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their chil-
dren."'3 4 States with statutes that create stepparent support liability
only where children are needy fail to satisfy this requirement.3 5 Thus,
welfare authorities may not rely on the assumption of support and may
consider stepparent resources in determining eligibility and need only if
such resources are actually being used for child support.
3 6
The Missouri legislature, apparently in response to this regulatory
compliance problem,3 7 enacted a very broad stepparent support law:
"A stepparent shall support his or her stepchild to the same extent that a
natural or adoptive parent is required to support his or her child so long
32 HAwAII REV. STAT. § 577-4 (1976).
33 See Goldsmith, AFDC Eligibility and the Federal Stepparent Regulation, 57 TEX. L. REV.
79, 79-83 (1978).
34 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a)(1) (1982). This rule does not affect the right of the state to seek
reimbursement from stepparents under state statutes creating stepparent support duties to
needy stepchildren.
35 See, e.g., Gaither v. Sterrett, 346 F. Supp. 1095, 1100, 1101 (N.D. Ind. 1972), afd, 409
U.S. 1070 (1972); Uhrovick v. Lavine, 43 A.D.2d 481, 483-84, 352 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32, af'd,
35 N.Y.2d 892, 324 N.E.2d 360, 364 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1974); Bunting v. Juras, 11 Or. App. 297,
300-01, 502 P.2d 607, 608-09 (1972). In states with no stepparent support statutes, the courts
have invalidated similar welfare policies as being inconsistent with the federal regulation. See,
e.g., Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 1972) (assumption by Minnesota welfare
authorities that stepparent income would be used to support stepchildren violates federal
regulation); Ojeda v. Hackney, 319 F. Supp. 149, 153 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (same), vacated zz part,
452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409, 413-14 (D. Conn.) (same),
af'dmnem., 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
In Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 (Ist Cir. 1977), the First Circuit upheld New
Hampshire's policy of automatic termination of AFDC benefits upon plaintiff's remarriage
after finding that the state's stepparent support statute complied with the federal regulation.
In a similar manner, the Iowa Supreme Court found that Iowa's common law stepparent
support doctrine satisfied the federal requirements. The Iowa court thereby upheld the state's
policy of automatically considering stepparent resources in determining level of need when
the stepparent resides with the children. Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., 197 N.W.2d
192 (Iowa), appeal dirmissed men., 409 U.S. 813 (1972).
36 See, e.g., Darrow v. D'Elia, 54 A.D.2d 905, 905, 388 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (1976) (stepparent
resources properly considered in determining level of need when stepparent actually contrib-
utes to support).
37 The Missouri law was enacted as part of a bill entitled "Public Health and Welfare:
Benefits for Public Assistance Recipients," H.B. 1462, 81st General Assembly (1982).
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as the stepchild is living in the same home as the stepparent. a3 8 The
statute dramatically expands the voluntary common law obligation of
stepparents. An evaluation of this expanded support duty requires the
consideration of many conflicting policies.
3 9
C. The Merits of Imposing Liability During Marriage
Many stepparents voluntarily contribute to the support of stepchil-
dren during marriage. As a practical matter, it is often difficult to pre-
vent the child's enjoyment of stepparent contributions for items such as
food and housing. A legal duty of support beyond these voluntary or
indirect contributions would properly accommodate the interests of all
parties.
4 0
Opponents of involuntary support obligations have traditionally
argued that such a law would discourage marriage to parents with mi-
nor children. 4 1 This argument is based upon questionable assumptions.
First, the rationale expresses the family law's historical preference for
marriage over other lifestyles.42 The law's bias toward marriage be-
comes less compelling, however, in an era when many members of soci-
ety are exploring alternatives to marriage.4 3 The law is beginning to
recognize and protect such alternatives."
38 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400.1 (Vernon Supp. 1984). In Minnesota, an apparently un-
popular statute requiring stepchild support from the stepparent who shares a home with the
child was enacted and repealed in the same year, 1981. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.021 (West
Supp. 1982), repealedby 1981 Minn. Laws 3d Spec. Sess. ch. 3, § 20 (effective Feb. 1, 1982).
39 See Lewis & Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies: The Case for '"ual Systems" 54
CALIF. L. REV. 748, 762-72 (1966).
40 See Berkowitz, supra note 3, at 227-29; Step Relationship, supra note 3, at 282-83. But see
Lewis & Levy, supra note 39, at 762-72 (arguing that most stepfathers voluntarily provide
adequate support for their stepchildren and that a legal support duty would not fairly bal-
ance conflicting interests which arise in varying circumstances).
41 See, e.g., tenBroek, The Impact of Welfare Law Upon Familj Law, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 458,
479 (1954).
42 In a recent United States Supreme Court case upholding New York State adoption
laws which permit adoption of a child without notice to the unmarried natural father, Justice
Stevens restated the preference for marriage in the following manner:
The institution of marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal
entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized structure
of our democratic society. In recognition of that role, and as part of their
general overreaching concern for serving the best interests of children, state
laws almost universally express an appropriate preference for the formal
family.
Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 (1983) (citations omitted).
43 In 1981, there were 3,616,000 individuals sharing a household with an unrelated per-
son of the opposite sex. There were almost 19 million households with only one member.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 42, 44 (103d ed. 1982-83).
44 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing that constitutional
rights of privacy extend to individuals, not just married couples); Bulloch v. United States,
487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (allowing tort cause of action by cohabitor for loss of consor-
tium); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831
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Furthermore, the "discourage marriage" argument assumes that
the single parent family is in financial need,4 5 and that the addition of a
spouse will ease the family's financial situation. It is ironic that the op-
ponents of an involuntary stepparent support requirement rely on the
argument to conclude that stepparents should have no financial respon-
sibility to stepchildren. Changes in the family and welfare laws,
designed to improve the economic condition of single parents, would
serve the interests of these individuals better than the system advocated
by opponents of a broad stepparent support obligation. The effective
enforcement of noncustodial parents' child support obligations, 46 and
increased public support for daycare, 47 for example, would ease the eco-
nomic pressure on single parents and on their marriage decisions.
Some single parents would prefer marriage for financial or other
reasons. 48 For most people, including potential stepparents, the mar-
riage decision is inevitably complex and involves more than economic
factors.4 9 The laws regulating marriage impose substantial economic
burdens upon spouses50 and do not discourage marriage.5 ' These facts
(1977) (allowing cause of action to enforce express or implied contract between cohabiting
unmarried individuals). But see Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10, 11, 445
A.2d 45,46 (App. Div. 1982) (expressly rejecting Bulloch by disallowing tort cause of action by
cohabitor for loss of consortium); Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J. Super. 591, 594-95, 444 A.2d
1141, 1142 (Law Div. 1982) (same); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 59, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207
(1979) (refusing to recognize cause of action for property division of cohabitors, on oral con-
tract, implied contract, and equitable theories, because recognition might "weaken marriage
as the foundation of our family-based society").
45 "There were 18.3 million persons living in families which included a divorced, sepa-
rated, remarried, or never-married woman. The poverty rate for these persons was 27 per-
cent, compared to 8 percent for all other persons in families." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-23, No. 84, DIVORCE,
CHILD CUSTODY, AND CHILD SUPPORT 4 (June 1979).
46 See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 71-78 (1979); Hunter, Child Support Law
and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 NARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6-15 (1983);
Krause, Reftections On Child Support, 17 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1983).
47 See Zeitlin & Campbell, Strategies to Address the Impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 on the Availability of Child Care for Low-
Income Families, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1601, 1603-07 (1982) (discussing levels of single mother
participation in labor force and corresponding need for child care).
48 The nonfinancial incentives of the single parent to marry include "formidable social
pressures," a desire to share child rearing responsibilities, and in some cases pressure from the
children who "like to see their parent with a partner." B. MADDOX, THE HALF-PARENT 52-
53 (1975).
49 See Lewis & Levy, supra note 39, at 764.
50 Spouses are required by law to support each other and the children of the marriage.
See H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 181-92; H. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 3-10. Spouses are entitled
to share each other's property pursuant to community property laws in eight states, see W.
MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 2:27-:34 (1982),
and pursuant to elective share and equitable distribution laws elsewhere. See Bartke, Marital
Sharing-Why Not Do It By Contract?, 67 GEO. LJ. 1131, 1133 nn.11-12 (1979).
51 In Hunter, supra note 46, at 22, the author suggests that the trend in some states
toward requiring stepparent support "increases the pressure on women to remarry," thereby
encouraging marriage.
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cast doubt on the assumption that a stepparent support duty would de-
crease the ability of single parents to find spouses.
To the extent that a support rule would give pause to the individ-
ual contemplating stepparenthood, moreover, the pause could be benefi-
cial. One sociologist has observed that financial surprises destroy many
stepmarriages.5 2 When partners do not discuss their finances in advance
of marriage, the realities they discover may lead to unhappiness for
themselves and the children, and ultimately to divorce.5 3 A study of
remarriages revealed that disagreements about children and money
were the most frequently stated reasons for marriage breakdown.5 4 To
the extent that stepparent support requirements would promote disclo-
sure, discussion, and planning in advance of marriage, they might ease
the entry into new relationships.
55
The argument against stepparent support requirements rests not
only on the fear of discouraging marriage to single parents, but also on
the alleged unfairness of imposing a support duty on one who is not the
biological or adoptive parent. According to this argument, the moral
responsibility of the parent for support, based on causation, 56 does not
extend to the stepparent.
Recent cases in which courts have required paternal support in
spite of the mother's fraudulent misrepresentations regarding contracep-
tion have reiterated the significance attached to the causal (biological)
relationship.5 7 These courts have regarded the father's intent to avoid
conception, even when sabotaged by the mother's behavior, as irrelevant
to support obligations. The procreative act alone has served as the basis
for imposing responsibility. For example, in a paternity suit in which
52 D. MAYLEAS, REWEDDED BLISS 39-111 (1977).
53 Id.
54 Messinger, Remarriage Between People With Children From Previous Marriages: A Proposal
for Preparation for Remarriage, 1976 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. COUNSELING 2, 193-99. The rate
of divorce is higher for second marriages than for first marriages. See BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-20, No. 297,
NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES IN THE UNITED STATES 6
(1975). The presence of stepchildren makes survival of a second marriage even less likely.
"Within the first five years over 44% of the newly blended families fail." Kargman, Stepchild
Support Obligations of Stepparents, 1983 FAM. REL. 231, 237.
55 Any attempt to accomplish these goals in a compulsory fashion, for example, by re-
quiring financial disclosure or counseling in order to obtain a marriage license, would raise
concerns about the constitutionally protected interests of the parties, as well as the effective-
ness and cost of the requirements. The same concerns about cost, effectiveness, and possible
privacy violations arise under mandatory counseling provisions in some marriage dissolution
statutes. See Seidelson, Systematic Marriage Investigation and Counseling in Divorce: Some Reflections
on Its Constitutional Propriety and General Desirability, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 60 (1967); Note,
Marriage Counseling Through the Divorce Courts-Another Look, 28 S.C.L. REV. 687 (1977).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
57 See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980);
Pamela P. v. Frank S., 88 A.D.2d 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982), afd, 59 N.Y.2d 1, 462
N.Y.S.2d 819, 449 N.E.2d 713 (1983).
1984]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:38
the father counterclaimed in tort for fraudulent misrepresentation by
the mother, a California appellate court rejected the father's claim as
too "radical a change in the socially accepted ideas and views of sexual
conduct, family relationship, parental obligations, and legal and moral re-
sponsibilifor one-s own conduct."58 Other courts have focused upon the
more specific interests that underlie the support obligation. In reversing
a trial court decision 9 allowing the father's fraud defense in a paternity
suit, a New York appellate court stated: "[T]he present provisions [of
the civil statute authorizing paternity suits] emphasize the welfare of the
child, over even the protection of the public purse. . . . Assuming the
father's allegation that he was deceived to be true, how does it logically
follow that the child should suffer?"
60
The act of forming a de facto family by marrying a parent and
establishing a home with stepchildren, like the procreative act, may rea-
sonably give rise to economic responsibility for the children. The court
in D.. . Hermanez61 relied on this theory to deny a mother's petition for
child support from paternal grandparents. The court reasoned that the
husband shared the mother's primary responsibility for her child: "The
stepfather of the child when he married her mother knowing about
Pamela assumed a legal obligation towards the child; moreover, a moral
and ethical responsibility for that child."
'62
58 Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 643, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620 (emphasis
added).
59 Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
The trial court did not allow the father to assert fraud as a complete defense, but only as a
basis for shifting the primary support duty to the mother. Id. at 985, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 347-48.
60 Pamela P. v. Frank S., 88 A.D.2d at 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 767. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court expressed a similar view in Hughes v. Hutt, 500 Pa. 209, 455 A.2d 623 (1983):
Indeed, the possibility of fabricated accusations, the less than certain effective-
ness of birth control methods, and the fact that claims like appellant's, if suc-
cessful, could result in the denial of support to innocent children whom the
Support Law was designed to protect, all illustrate that allegations of a
mother's failure to use birth control have absolutely no place in a proceeding
to determine child support.
500 Pa. at 213, 455 A.2d at 625. Cf Inez M. v. Nathan G., 114 Misc. 2d 282, 451 N.Y.S.2d
607 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (rejecting fraud defense, on ground of equal protection between
illegitimate children and others).
61 204 Misc. 650, 123 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953).
62 Id. at 651, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 235. '
In Fischer v. Fischer, 106 Neb. 477, 184 N.W. 116 (1921), the Nebraska Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion concerning the nonfmancial responsibilities of stepparents.
[W]e would be loath to conclude. . . that a woman marrying a widower with
minor children owed no ,duty of nurture and maternal advice to them. ...
So long as the widowed with children are permitted to remarry, we think the
[failure to impose a duty] would be contrary to natural instincts and public
policy.
Id. at 483, 184 N.W. at 119. The court held that an antenuptial contract wherein the hus-
band agreed to leave property to the wife's child in exchange for her promise to care for his
five minor children was unenforceable. "[T]he agreement of [the wife] to care for and be a
mother to the minor children . . . furnishe[d] no good or valuable consideration for the con-
STEPPARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
The Hernanez court relied on the economic sharing and allocation
of responsibilities in marriage to justify its result: "The theory upon
which the law. . . holds a stepfather chargeable with the support of his
stepchild is that his wife by virtue of the marriage had ended completely
her ability and capacity to take care of her dependents, she giving to
him her time and efforts and housewifely duties. ' 63 Although many
modern families have rejected this traditional model in which wives do
not work outside the home, the larger concept expressed by the court
has continuing relevance. Most marriages involve economic sharing,
which creates more career and financial options for family members.
For example, one partner may forego financial independence, and rely
upon the financial resources of the other. Family support duties place
the force of law behind these private arrangements in a manner that
comports with the expectations of most family members. Including
stepchildren in the family for this purpose is fair and consistent with a
flexible model of marriage.
D. Balancing Stepparent and Natural Parent Support Duties
During Marriage
In formulating a stepparent support law, lawmakers must consider
the relationship between the stepparent obligation and the natural par-
ents' duty to support the same child. A support order, enforceable by
the child's legal representative, frequently embodies the noncustodial
parent support obligation. The child's representative probably could
not enforce the stepparent obligation in the same direct manner, due to
a judicial policy of noninvolvement in the financial affairs of ongoing
families. Acting out of respect for family privacy, unwillingness to inter-
fere in the financial decisionmaking of the ongoing family, and concern
that legal intervention might disrupt family integrity, courts generally
disallow direct suits by dependent family members against the support-
ing parent or spouse.
64
tract" because she was obligated by law to provide these services. 106 Neb. at 483, 184 N.W.
at 119. The same "natural instincts and public policy" relied upon by the court as the basis
for an obligation of "maternal advice and nurture" also justify financial duties within the
stepfamily.
63 Hennanez, 204 Misc. at 653, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
64 See McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 237-38, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1953) (spousal
support); see also L. WErI-ZMAN, supra note 6, at 40 (discussing McGuire); Paulsen, Support Rights
and Duties Between Husband and Wi, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709, 719-20 (1956) (same).
The policy of judicial noninvolvement has received a great deal of criticism. See, e.g.,
Hunter, supra note 46, at 18-19; Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Dis-
aimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55, 74-79. Serious reevaluation would be appropriate
before extending the policy to yet another category of family support obligations, those of the
stepfamily. Direct enforcement of the common law support obligation of the stepparent
standing in loco parentis is generally unavailable because the stepparent can terminate the
relationship at will. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Enforcement of support obligations in the ongoing family generally takes the form of
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Noncustodial parents have sought, with varying degrees of success,
to rely upon stepparent support as the basis for reducing their own child
support obligations. In State v. Fzizister,65 the Washington Court of Ap-
peals construed the state's criminal nonsupport statute, which extends to
both parents and stepparents, but does not address the relationships
among the various duties created. The defendant father argued that the
stepparent duty increased the state's burden of proof under the statute
to include the child's need as well as the defendant's willful nonsupport.
The court held that the stepparent duty affected neither the obligation
of the natural parent nor the rule that willful nonsupport alone consti-
tuted a prima facie criminal violation:66
We refuse to accept the premise that the legislature intended by [in-
cluding a stepparent support obligation] to shift the burden of sup-
port from the natural parent to the stepparent or to furnish an excuse
to the natural parent for not supporting his children. Under the stat-
ute, the burden of support is now joint and several.
67
In a case involving modification of a noncustodial father's court-
ordered support obligation, the Iowa Supreme Court similarly held that
the addition of another source of support should not affect natural par-
ent support obligations. In Mears v. Mears,68 the court evaluated the fa-
ther's ability to pay without reference to the stepfather's in loco parentis
support obligation. On this basis, the court held that a substantial in-
crease in the father's income justified an upward modification of the
support order. As to the needs of the children, the court found that the
stepfather enjoyed a more affluent lifestyle than the father, and refused
to charge the father with resulting increased support costs. The court
held:
[T]he question of [the stepfather's] duty to support his wife's children
while in his home should be limited to the extent their being in his
home may have increased the cost of their maintenance by reason of a
higher living scale than that experienced during the marriage of their
third party suits by creditors, welfare authorities, or the state in criminal proceedings for
nonsupport. See, e.g., Commissioner of Social Servs. v. Russell, 85 Misc.2d 809, 380 N.Y.S.2d
998 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1976). In this case, the Commissioner brought suit for support on behalf
of a stepchild under a statute conferring discretion upon the court to make such orders. The
court found, however, that the stepfather was not aware of the stepson, who was a public
charge, at the time he married the natural mother. The court declined to indirectly enforce the
stepparent support duty, emphasizing potential negative effects on the stepmarriage.
A support order against the stepfather in the instant case, would put further
strain on this marriage and might very well cause the [stepfather] to seek and
secure a divorce. In that event, not only would the child be a public charge,
but in all likelihood, so will the mother.
85 Misc. 2d at 815, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
65 5 Wash. App. 44, 486 P.2d 114 (1971).
66 Id. at 47-48, 486 P.2d at 117.
67 Id at 48, 486 P.2d at 117.





The natural father remained responsible for the children's needs, com-
puted according to their prior standard of living, to the extent of his
ability to pay.
70
The results in Mears and Fz)7ister enhance the financial well-being of
stepchildren by guaranteeing an uninterrupted source of support from
the noncustodial parent. Support statutes in some states accomplish the
same result by expressly providing that stepparent duties do not affect
the natural parent's support obligation.
7 1
In Logan v. Logan,72 on the other hand, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that natural parent support levels may be reduced
by virtue of stepparent obligations to the same children. 73 Logan in-
volved three sets of support obligations. The remarried mother peti-
tioned for enforcement of a child support order against her former
husband, who had remarried a woman with children. The court con-
strued the New Hampshire support statute, which imposes support obli-
gations on parents for their minor children and defines children broadly
to include stepchildren, 74 as imposing equivalent duties upon parents
and stepparents. The court held that evidence of the obligation owed
by the custodial mother's new husband was admissible in the hearing to
establish the children's level of need. 75 The court also held that the fa-
ther's new obligation to his stepchildren could affect his ability to pay
support for children of his first marriage. 76 On this related issue, the
court's broad holding creates desirable flexibility in allocating limited
resources among successive families.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Logan to consider
the stepparent's financial ability to satisfy the children's needs when de-
termining the noncustodial parent's support obligation, however, is not
a beneficial rule. In many instances, court ordered levels of child sup-
port provide only a fraction of support needs, with the custodial parent
69 Id. at 518.
70 Id. AccordKlein v. Sarubin, 471 A.2d 881 (Pa. Super. 1984). The Iowa court's exclu-
sive reliance in Mears on the common law in loco parentis doctrine to find a basis for steppar-
ent support liability is puzzling. The Uniform Support of Dependents Law, as enacted in
Iowa, imposes civil support obligations on all parents for their children and defines children
to include stepchildren. IOWA CODE §§ 252A.2(3), 252A.3 (1977). In Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of
Social Servs., 197 N.W.2d 192, 200 (Iowa 1972), appeal dismissed mem., 409 U.S. 813 (1972), the
court mentioned the statute but placed reliance upon the common law doctrine. Set supra
note 35 (discussing Kelly).
71 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-
7-8 (Supp. 1983).
72 120 N.H. 839, 424 A.2d 403 (1980).
73 Id. at 842-43, 424 A.2d at 405.
74 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:1 to -A:2 (1974).
75 Logan, 120 N.H. at 842, 424 A.2d at 405.
76 Id. at 843, 424 A.2d at 405.
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or the state making up the difference. 7 7 The stepparent should share
this part of the support burden, to the extent of his or her ability, as
required by the Washington and Iowa rules.78 Reducing the level of
contribution from the noncustodial parent, as the New Hampshire court
did, jeopardizes the children's financial security and unfairly shifts re-
sponsibility from the natural parent, who fully expected to support the
children during their minority. Where the noncustodial natural parent
has the ability to pay a continuing level of child support, the addition of
a stepparent duty should not reduce the obligation.
Thus, during marriage a stepparent support law should require the
stepparent to share the obligation of his or her spouse.79 This approach
to stepparent support would authorize third parties, such as creditors
and welfare authorities, incurring expenses for the support of minor chil-
dren, to sue any or all responsible adults. The general rule of judicial
noninvolvement in the financial affairs of ongoing families8 0 may fore-
close direct suit by children against the adults with whom they reside.
Direct suit by children against the noncustodial natural parent is avail-
able, of course; and the existence of a stepparent duty should not affect
the levels of support determined in such proceedings.8 1
E. Post-Divorce Stepparent Support
Support obligations of natural parents end at the child's death,
emancipation, or age of majority, or upon legal termination of the rela-
tionship by the state. Support obligations survive dissolution of the par-
ents' marriage, and become directly enforceable at that time. As a
general rule, however, courts and legislatures have not extended step-
parent support obligations beyond marriage termination. This rule of
automatic termination of the stepparent support after divorce can, in
some cases, produce harsh results for dependent stepfamily members.
8 2
Most lawmakers regard the stepparent-child relationship as deriva-
tive, that is, existing only by virtue of the marriage of the stepparent to
77 See, e.g., Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique ofCurrent Prac-
tice, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 49, 50-54 (1982) (noting that child support awards rarely meet child's
minimal needs).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
79 Marriage contracts may allocate the support duty between the spouses. See L. WEI'rz-
MAN, supra note 6, at. 347-59 (discussing enforceability during ongoing marriage).
80 See supra text accompanying note 64.
81 If the state has terminated the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, then
that parent's support duty will not continue. Adoption by the stepparent can generally take
place only following such a termination. See generally Note, A Survq of State Law Authorizing
Stepparent Adoptions Without the Noncustodial Parent's Consent, 15 AKRON L. REv. 567 (1982) (dis-
cussing easier standard used for involuntary termination in stepparent adoption cases than in
other contexts). This Article limits its scope to families where the stepparent has not adopted
the children.
82 See infra text accompanying note 87.
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the natural parent. Even in cases where a support duty existed during
marriage, this model allows no extension of the obligation after mar-
riage termination. In the words of one court, "[i]t is manifest, inasmuch
as the liability for support of stepchildren is a collateral one, being as it
were, an offshoot of the marriage itself, that once the marriage ends or is
declared non-existent, the collateral liability to support stepchildren also
ends."8 3 Other courts have reached the same result, imposing no liabil-
ity on stepparents following marriage termination. 84 In some jurisdic-
tions, support statutes require the result by ekpress limitation.
85
83 Cynthia M. v. Elton M., 69 Misc. 2d 653, 654, 330 N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1972) (denying mother's petition for child support from former husband).
84 See, e.g., Needel v. Needel, 15 Ariz. App. 471, 474, 489 P.2d 729, 732 (1971) (stepchil-
dren are not "minor children of the parties" pursuant to statute authorizing child support
awards at time of divorce), overruled on other grounds, Becchelli v. Becchelli, 109 Ariz. 229, 234,
508 P.2d 59, 64 (1973); Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(husband does not owe support to another man's child born during the marriage, with whom
in loco parentis relationship was established during marriage); Pilgrim v. Pilgrim, 118 Ind.
App. 6, 13, 75 N.E.2d 159, 162 (1947) (no continuing duty to child born during marriage);
Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 37 A.D.2d 629, 629, 323 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1971) (divorce court had
no authority to order stepchild support); Elwell v. Sisson, 81 Misc. 2d 1070, 1072, 367
N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975) (statutory duty to provide support for stepchild who
receives public assistance terminates with divorce); Krane v. Krane, 83 Misc. 2d 714, 715, 373
N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1975) (stepfather's court-ordered obligation to provide
support to stepchildren on public charge basis terminated with stepmarriage); Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 58 Wash. 2d 510, 513, 364 P.2d 444, 445 (1961) (stepparent can terminate in loco parentis
relationship at time of divorce, thereby ending all support obligations).
Even a stepparent who stood in loco parentis during marriage, and agreed to continue
support in a contract that was incorporated into the divorce decree, was held to have no
continuing duty to support the family. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 284, 412 A.2d 396, 402
(1980). In Brown, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that imprisonment for contempt was
an inappropriate sanction when the stepfather fell into arrears, because his obligation to the
child did not fall into the family support exception to the state's constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for nonpayment ofdebts. According to one commentator, "[tihe Brown
decision further clarifies Maryland's position that stepchildren are afforded less protection
than natural children. It is inequitable that Maryland, like so many other states, has failed to
provide adequate protection for stepchildren. . . ." Case Comment, Domestic Relations--Sup-
port of Stepchildren--Brown v. Brown, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 190, 200 (1980) (citations omitted).
85 See OR. REv. STAT. § 109.053 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (Supp. 1983);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West Supp.
1984).
An earlier version of the Kansas divorce statute contained language broad enough to
allow continuing stepparent support orders:
The court shall make provisions for the custody, support and education of the
minor children . . . . In connection with any decree under this article, the
court may set apart such portion of the property of either the husband or the
wife, or both of them, as may seem necessary and proper for the support of all
of the minor children of the parties, or ofeither of them.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a) (1976) (amended 1982) (emphasis added). In Zeller v. Zeller,
195 Kan. 452, 455, 407 P.2d 478, 482 (1965), the Kansas Supreme Court held that the first
sentence of§ 60-1610(a) did not require a stepfather to provide support for a stepchild, point-
ing to the language of the second sentence by way of contrast. The legislature subsequently
modified the second sentence to eliminate reference to the child of either spouse. The current
Kansas divorce statute provides that "the court shall make provisions for the support and
education of the minor children. . . . [T]he court may set apart any portion of property of
CORNVELL LAW REVIEW
The derivative model of the steprelationship and the resulting auto-
matic support termination rule ignore the variety and complexity of re-
lationships created in the stepfamily setting. The proposal to impose
support duties during marriage was based on the existence of the de
facto family unit.8 6 In many cases, the relationships created in the
stepfamily have consequences for family members following marriage
termination. Family members may develop emotional and financial ex-
pectations and reliance interests based on steprelationships. A rule of
law extending support in appropriate cases beyond the termination of
marriage would recognize and protect these interests.
87
A limited body of law supports a rule requiring continuing steppar-
ent support after marriage termination in appropriate situations. A few
American cases have, in special circumstances, imposed continuing step-
parent support duties.88 Furthermore, for financial purposes other than
support, courts have sometimes regarded the steprelationship as ex-
tending beyond marriage termination.89 Finally, an English statute ex-
pressly authorizes dissolution courts to make stepchild support orders.90
The policies underlying these laws can provide the basis for a more gen-
eral support duty in the United States.
The limited judicial exception to the general rule of stepparent lia-
bility ending at marriage termination applies to the extra-marital child
for whom support from the natural father has become unavailable as a
result of the stepmarriage. The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Burse v.
Burse9' held that "where a man marries a woman who is pregnant by
another man, and there is no showing of fraud in the inception of the
marriage, the husband is conclusively presumed to be the father of the
child."' 92 The court noted that under the state's paternity statutes mar-
riage to the stepfather terminated the mother's right to sue the natural
father for support as well as the natural father's ability to legitimate the
either the husband or wife, or both, that seems necessary and proper for the support ofthe
child." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a) (1983) (emphasis added). In light of the construction
of the "minor children" language in Zeller, it is highly unlikely that the current statute will be
read to encompass stepchild support orders in divorce proceedings.
A limited exception to the general rule against continuing stepparent liability after mar-
riage termination appears in a North Dakota statute imposing a support duty upon the step-
parent who receives stepchildren into the family, and continues the duty "during the
marriage and so long thereafter as they remain in the stepparent's family." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-09 (Supp. 1983). The liability prescribed by the statute is similar to the com-
mon law in loco parents doctrine in that liability remains voluntary with the stepparent.
86 See supra part I.D.
87 See Berkowitz, supra note 3, at 227-29; Step Relationship, supra note 3, at 282-83.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 91-100.
89 See infla text accompanying notes 102-12.
90 See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
91 48 Ohio App. 2d 244, 356 N.E.2d 755 (1976).
92 Id. at 248, 356 N.E.2d at 758.
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child. 93 The husband was, therefore, required to fill in the paternal gap
created by his marriage to the mother. The rationale extends only to
the limited situation where the child is born following the
stepmarriage.
94
Courts in California and New York have also recognized limited
exceptions to the general rule of no stepparent support duty following
divorce. These exceptions are based on an equitable estoppel theory.
Clevenger v. Clevenger95 involved an extra-marital child conceived by the
mother while her husband was away in military service. The husband
accepted the child, born shortly after his return, into the family home
for ten years and held him out to the public as his own son. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal concluded that locating the natural father for sup-
port would be "realistically impossible"96 after ten years, but held that
the husband would be estopped from asserting the child's illegitimacy
and his own nonpaternity at the time of divorce only if certain facts
were established at trial. The necessary findings would include the hus-
band's misrepresentation to the child expressly or by-implication that he
was the natural father; the child's belief and reliance upon the misrepre-
sentation; resulting benefit to the husband in the form of parental status
and affection; and resulting detriment to the child in terms of lost rights
against the biological father and potential harm upon learning his true
status.
The doctrine of estoppel as formulated by the court in Clevenger pro-
vides inadequate protection for stepchildren. Legitimate concerns
raised by the Clevenger court, including the needs and interests of the
93 Id. at 248, 356 N.E.2d at 758. The Ohio paternity statute referred to in Burs, OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 (Page 1980) (repealed 1982), authorized any "unmarried wo-
man" to file a complaint. As construed by the court, the mother's marriage terminated the
cause of action for the child born thereafter. Relieving the natural father of all future respon-
sibility was not a particularly well-reasoned approach to the issue of support for extra-mari-
tal children.
94 Id. at 248, 356 N.E.2d at 758. The Ohio rule originated in a suit against the natural
father for support, following death of the stepfather who had married the mother during
pregnancy. Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605 (1885). The rule was first ap-
plied to resolve the issue ofstepparent support at the time of marriage dissolution in Gustin v.
Gustin, 108 Ohio App. 171, 161 N.E.2d 68 (1958).
A trial court in New York found a more general basis for extending the stepparent sup-
port duty when the marriage relationship was terminated by death. Jones v. Stautz, 5 Misc.
2d 185, 159 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1957). In a state-initiated neglect proceeding, the
child was removed from the stepfather and placed in the custody of petitioner Jones, who
sued the stepfather for support. The court distinguished an earlier New York case in which it
had been held that divorce terminated the stepparent support obligation, stating "[t]he death
of the mother was not a wilful act. It was an act of God. The relationship of stepparent to
stepchild once established is a valid and subsisting relationship that cannot be destroyed at
the will of the respondent stepfather." 5 Misc. 2d at 187, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
95 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961); see also Hails, supra note 18, at 716-18
(discussing Clevenger).
96 189 Cal. App. 2d at 671, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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child, remain relevant whether or not the child knows his true status.
The court imposed the knowledge limitation, however, because it uti-
lized the well-established remedy of estoppel rather than formulating
relief on the basis of the parties' status.
9 7
A different formulation of the estoppel doctrine, focusing on the
wife's reliance interest, enabled a New York trial court to impose a con-
tinuing child support obligation on the stepfather in Lewis v. Lewis. 98
The stepfather had supported the child, who was three years old at the
time of marriage, and had changed the birth certificate to include his
name. According to the court, the mother's reasonable reliance on this
behavior as a promise of future security estopped the husband from de-
nying paternity at the time of divorce.99
The Lewis court's formulation of the equitable estoppel doctrine is
broader than that of the Clevenger court. First, the Lewis court ignored
the age of the child at the time of marriage. In addition, the reasonable
reliance of the custodial parent on the financially responsible behavior
of the stepparent will be easier to establish in many cases than the
child's reliance on a misrepresentation of parentage, as required under
the Clevenger test. 100
Both the Lewis and Clevenger formulas require the party seeking the
estoppel to show the unavailability of the natural parent. The presence
of a natural noncustodial parent with support responsibilities does not
prevent members of a stepfamily from forming financial and other ex-
pectations regarding the stepparent-child relationship. The estoppel
theories developed by the courts are too narrow to accommodate this
reality.101 Legislatures and courts should formulate stepparent support
97 In In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979), the
Court of Appeal of California applied the Clevenger formula to impose liability on a husband
following marriage dissolution. The court required the husband to support his wife's child,
who was born just a few days before their marriage. The court expressly found that the boy
believed the husband to be his father.
98 85 Misc. 2d 610, 381 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
99 The court will not conjecture as to what actions, if any, Kim's mother may
have taken for the child's interests in the absence of her husband's "adoption"
of her daughter. Suffice it to say that after the plaintiff's actions, she was
justified in relying upon his sincerity in being responsible for the child. Thus,
the theory of equitable estoppel now prevents the husband from denying that
assumption of responsibility upon which his wife relied.
85 Misc. 2d at 612-13, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 633. AccordMiller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351
(1984).
100 A Florida court expressly rejected this broader formulation of the estoppel doctrine on
facts similar to the Lewis case in Albert v. Albert, 415 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
holding that the misrepresentation must be one "of parentage... made to a spouse or child
who relied upon it to his or her detriment." Id. at 820. The husband's signing of the birth
certificate and promise to the mother to treat the child as his own did not estop him from
refusing support following marriage termination.
101 Cases in which the husband at the time of marriage dissolution disclaims financial
responsibility for a child conceived by artificial insemination during marriage are analogous
to the stepparent support situation. In both, spouses rely on the absence of a biological rela-
tionship to avoid the support obligation to a child with whom a de facto parent-child rela-
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laws to expressly allow for continuing stepparent suppport responsibility
in appropriate cases.
Courts have generally been more willing to regard the stepparent-
child relationship as independent of the marriage creating it, and thus
capable of surviving marriage termination, in the context of legal issues
other than support. In In re Bordeaux Estate,10 2 for example, the
Supreme Court of Washington construed an inheritance tax statute that
subjected stepchildren to lower inheritance tax rates. The tax authori-
ties contended that children of the decedent's predeceased wife were not
"stepchildren" under the statute because their mother had failed to sur-
vive the decedent. The court refused to narrowly construe the word
"stepchild" in this fashion, observing that "the modern tendency has
been, and rightly so, to assimilate the stepchild to the natural child."' 0 3
The Maine Supreme Court relied on Bordeaux to reach the same
result on the inheritance tax rate issue.'0 4 The court's opinion reveals an
understanding of the potential depth and independence of the steppar-
ent-child relationship.
[T]ies of affinity are often stronger than those between collateral, or
even lineal, kinsmen by blood. The relationship of stepchild and step-
parent, once created, is not generally regarded as terminated by the
death of one of the parties to the marriage or by a divorce, nor by the
remarriage of the step-parent.'
05
The inheritance tax cases necessarily involve voluntay provision for
the stepchild, 06 and are thus distinguishable from the involuntary post-
divorce support situation. Nevertheless, these cases support the view
that the stepparent-child relationship is not necessarily collateral to the
stepmarriage relationship. The policies of "assimilating stepchildren"
and protecting de facto relationships, relied on in these cases, bear sig-
nificantly on the support issue.
In a nonsupport context, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in
tionship existed. Courts have had a much easier time finding estoppel in the artificial
insemination cases, where the child was conceived in reliance on the husband's representa-
tions that he would act as the father. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246
N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). See generally Shaman, LegalAspects of Artifrial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L.
331 (1979-80); Comment, Artifcial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 935.
The estoppel theory has also been applied to de facto parent-child relationships in the
doctrine of adoption by estoppel or equitable adoption. See H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 653-
58.
102 37 Wash. 2d 561, 225 P.2d 433 (1950).
103 37 Wash. 2d at 594, 225 P.2d at 451.
104 Depositors Trust Co. of Augusta v. Johnson, 222 A.2d 49, 52 (Me. 1966).
105 Id at 54.
106 In another context where the stepparent voluntarily provided for the child of a prede-
ceased spouse, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a rule limiting beneficiaries under a frater-
nal organization's insurance program to "relatives" permitted the designation of a stepchild.
Simcoke v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Iowa, 84 Iowa 383, 51 N.W. 8 (1892).
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Strawhorn v. Strawhorn0 7 recently made economic provision for a
stepchild from resources of the unwilling stepparent at the time of di-
vorce. Pursuant to a statute authorizing exclusive use awards "to permit
the children of the family to continue to live in the environment and
community which is familiar to them and to permit the continued occu-
pancy of the family home. . . by a spouse with custody of a minor child
who has a need to live in that home,"10 8 the trial court had awarded use
of the marital home to the wife and her child of a former marriage. On
appeal, the stepfather emphasized the connection between this type of
award and a continuing support obligation, arguing "that although he
ha[d] no legal duty to support appellee's son of a former marriage, the
use and possession award nevertheless impose[d] such a duty."' 0 9 The
mother responded that the award "only r[an] to the benefit of the
spouse."' 10 The Strawhorn court implied its belief that the statute man-
dated indirect child support, by discussing the legislative concern for
children expressed in the legislation. The court relied on this policy in
affirming the award."'
The stepfather in Strawhorn correctly asserted that the stepchild's
use of his interest in the home was inconsistent with the general rule
imposing no financial responsibility for stepchildren following divorce.
The Maryland statute, however, as construed by the court, contem-
plated deviation from the general rule. The same interests that justified
the court's exclusive use order, including the child's needs and the par-
ties' expectations regarding the future, justify other continuing legal ob-
ligations between stepparent and child, including support obligations. "1
2
107 49 Md. App. 649, 435 A.2d 466 (1981).
108 MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06(a) (1984).
109 Strawhom, 49 Md. App. at 651, 435 A.2d at 468.
110 Id. at 651, 435 A.2d at 468.
111 Id. at 652, 435 A.2d at 468-69.
112 Without mentioning the Strawhorn case, the highest court in Maryland subsequently
held that the family home statute did not include stepchildren. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md.
183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982). The Strawhom court had relied upon a change in statutory lan-
guage from an earlier version providing for "children of the parties" to the current "any
minor child," and on the current "children of the family" terminology, in holding that the
legislature intended to include stepchildren. Strawhorn, 49 Md. App. at 655-56, 435 A.2d at
470. The court of appeals in Bledsoe considered the same language and legislative history and
concluded that "[i]f the legislature had intended to so drastically change the scope of the
provision it most certainly would have amended the language 'children of the family.'
Clearly, that phrase does not connote any different meaning than 'children of the parties.' "
Bledsoe, 294 Md. at 192, 448 A.2d at 358. This reading of the statute unquestionably excluded
stepchildren.
Another broad construction of statutory language, to the economic advantage of
stepchildren following marriage breakdown, occurred in State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wash. App. 560,
507 P.2d 1223 (1973). The court in Gillaspie read Washington's criminal nonsupport statute,
which expressly applied to stepparents until "the termination of the relationship of husband
and wife," to impose support duties during the period of marital separation. The court ob-
served that "the law has been developing toward the integration of stepchildren into the
family with rights equal to those of natural children." 8 Wash. App. at 562, 507 P.2d at 1224
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F. Formulating a Post-Divorce Support Law
The statutory law of England has for two decades authorized courts
to make stepchild support orders in separation and divorce proceedings.
The statute protects the "child of the family," defined as any child "who
has been treated by both [spouses] as a child of their family." 3 In de-
ciding whether to order child support from a spouse who is not the natu-
ral parent, the court must
have regard (among other circumstances of the case)
(a) to whether that party had assumed any responsibility for the
child's maintenance and, if so, to the extent to which, and the basis
upon which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length
of time for which that party discharged such responsibility;
(b) to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that
party did so knowing that the child was not his or her own;
(c) to the liability of any other person to maintain the child."1
4
The English statute provides a model for legislation in the United
States that would confer jurisdiction upon courts to make stepparent
support orders. The English approach to stepparent support obligations
does not constitute a radical departure from procedures presently used
in this country with regard to natural child support. Contemporary
American child support statutes commonly confer discretion on judges
to determine the appropriateness and level of awards by applying a list
of factors to each individual case.'1 5 Although this approach involves
(citations omitted). Accord Tutko v. Tutko, 86 A.D.2d 974, 448 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1982) (civil
support statute); Director of Child Support Enforcement Bureau v. Fariello, 74 A.D.2d 905,
425 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1980) (civil support statute); Mercer v. Mercer, 26 A.D.2d 450, 275
N.Y.S.2d 83 (1966) (civil support statute). But see Montayre v. Montayre, 175 Misc. 202, 22
N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (civil support statute).
113 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 52(1).
An earlier version of the statute referred to the "relevant child" and defined the term to
mean "a child of one party to the marriage who has been acceptedas one of the family by the
other party." Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, ch. 72, § 46(2) (emphasis added) (repealed
1973); see also Cretney, Somebody Else's Child, 113 SOLIC. J. 4 (1969) (discussing the Act). The
change in the law was made to overcome a narrow judicial construction of the word "ac-
cepted." Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 52 note.
114 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 25(3).
115 For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act child support section provides
the following factors:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, mainte-
nance, or child support, the court may order either or both parents owing a
duty of support to a child to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his
support, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant
factors including.
(1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educa-
tional needs; and
(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
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administrative costs and some unpredictability, its flexibility accommo-
dates the diversity of modern families.
A stepparent support law should require courts to consider the fol-
lowing factors when deciding whether to require support following di-
vorce: the length of the marriage, the financial arrangements of the
parties during marriage, the abilities of each adult, and projected needs
of the child following divorce. The duration of the stepfamily relation-
ship and the arrangements made by the spouses for allocating financial
and other responsibilities within the family bear on the determination of
whether the parties formed expectations that the resources of the step-
parent would be available in the future. For example, the natural par-
ent who sacrificed earning capacity in order to make nonfinancial
contributions to the family, in reliance on the financial capacity of the
stepparent may be unable to support the stepchild at the time of dissolu-
tion. In such a case, the reliance factor weighs in favor of a stepparent
support order. During marriage, stepparent support responsibility can
be regarded as a sharing of the duty owed by the custodial spouse.'
1 6
Following dissolution, both spouses' duties must be defined separately
and balanced with the obligation of the other parent. The best ap-
proach would consider all facts and circumstances affecting the financial
ability of each adult, in addition to the factors mentioned above, in allo-
cating responsibility.
In summary, the current law imposing stepparent support duties
following marriage termination only in limited estoppel situations1 17 op-
erates unfairly in some cases. When a stepfamily of substantial duration
resulting in economic dependence has been created, continuing eco-
nomic responsibility would better achieve the family law's goals of clar-
ity and protection. The almost absolute bar to continuing stepparent
support orders ignores the variety of factual situations in which the issue
may arise. Laws allocating responsibility on the basis of all the circum-
stances of each case would enhance the interests of stepfamily members
and the state.
II
CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS
In the ongoing natural family, both parents share the right to phys-
ical custody and decisionmaking authority for their children, as well as
responsibility for support.1 18 At the time of marriage dissolution, courts
frequently divide the natural parent-child status into its various compo-
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309 (1973).
116 See supra text accompanying notes 7 7-79.
117 See sup/ra text accompanying notes 91-101.
118 According to Blackstone, "[t]he power of parents over their children is derived from
... their duty; this authority being given them, partly to enable the parent more effectually
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nents, determining the extent to which each parent will continue to
have access to and responsibility for the child. In defining stepparent-
child relationships, lawmakers must separately consider the financial
and custodial aspects, according to policies relevant to each.119
Two distinct factual situations give rise to issues of stepparent cus-
tody or visitation rights. First, the stepparent may attempt to assert
rights in a marriage dissolution proceeding. The second category of
cases arise at the death of the stepparent's spouse when the other natural
parent may seek to eliminate all rights of the stepparent. In both situa-
tions, termination of the marriage between stepparent and natural par-
ent places the relationship between stepparent and child in jeopardy. 120
to perform his duty, and partly as a recompence for his care and trouble in the faithful
discharge of it." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440.
119 There is legal authority defining the stepparent-child status to encompass one, but
not the other, of the financial and custodial aspects of the parent-child relationship. For
example, the Missouri stepparent support statute states that it "shall not be construed as
granting to a stepparent any right to the care and custody of a stepchild." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 453.400.4 (Vernon Supp. 1983). Conversely, the Arizona Court of Appeals construed the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provision relating to custody jurisdiction to extend to
stepchildren, while noting that the child support provision did not authorize support orders
for such children. In explaining the discrepancy, the court applauded the legislature's move-
ment away from the "outmoded view that custody and visitation rights are primarily a bene-
fit to the parent, to be enjoyed in compensation for the duty to support." Bryan v. Bryan, 132
Ariz. 353, 356, 645 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); see infia text accompanying notes
160-66 (discussing Bran).
The Supreme Court of Utah has held, however, that a stepfather's request for visitation
also opens the door to potential support liability.
A hearing could determine not only the right to visitation, but could deter-
mine whether that right should be conditioned on a requirement that the
stepfather accept an obligation to assist in the support of the child. . . . Loco
parentis does not envision that a stepparent be permitted to enjoy the rights
of a natural parent without also accepting the responsibilities that are
incurred.
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978). The English Matrimonial Causes Act au-
thorizes both stepparent support orders and custody awards. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973,
ch. 18, § 52.
120 In the stepfamily, as in the biological family, legal questions of custody and control
typically arise only after marriage termination. While the stepfamily is ongoing, the spouses
generally resolve disagreements regarding the children on a private basis. During this time,
rights of the other natural parent are generally asserted against the custodial parent rather
than the stepparent.
The stepparent who stands in loco parentis to the child assumes the rights and responsi-
bilities of parenthood. See supra Part I.A. The doctrine should suffice to confer upon the
stepparent a custodial interest during the ongoing stepfamily. Frequently, the stepparent's
spouse, as primary custodian, will have the decisionmaking responsibility for the child. The
in loco parentis doctrine formalizes the reality that the parenting stepparent shares responsi-
bility with the custodial natural parent. See Step Relationship, supra note 3, at 280-83 (propos-
ing shared custodial status for parent and stepparent who establishes household with the
child); see also Aulik, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent Adoption, 12 U.C.D. L. REv.
604 (1979) (proposing legislation authorizing stepparent petition for appointment as "joint
custodian" with the natural parent).
In the biological family, the issue of parent custody rarely comes to the state's attention
while the family is ongoing. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory
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Under such circumstances, the court may impose the derivative model
of the steprelationship12 1 to deny the stepparent continuing custodial
rights following marriage termination.
The stepparent who wishes to maintain contact with the child faces
difficult substantive and procedural legal hurdles. A substantive prefer-
ence for the natural parent operates in many cases against stepparents.
Moreover, in many states, jurisdiction of the dissolution courts to hear
stepparent requests for custody or visitation is ambiguous. As a result,
the family laws fail to achieve the goals of providing certainty and pro-
tection for stepfamily members.
A. Jurisdiction in Marriage Dissolution Proceedings
Judicial power to hear issues of child custody is not unlimited. Ju-
risdiction exists, as a general rule, only when the child's family is trou-
bled and judicial intervention is necessary to assure the child's
welfare. 122 For example, courts may issue orders regarding the children
of divorcing parents. Statutes regulating jurisdiction in marriage disso-
lution proceedings do not deal expressly with the subject matter of
stepchildren. When requested to consider custody and visitation under
such laws, some courts have declared themselves powerless to act.
Others, confronted with children whose needs would be ignored by judi-
cial nonaction, have construed the statutes broadly to authorize orders
regarding stepchildren. The need for unambiguous legislation is
compelling.
123
education); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (medical treatment). The depen-
dency and neglect laws involve the state in the ongoing family in cases where parents have
failed in their custodial responsibilities. See, e.g., MICH. ComP. LAws §§ 722.621-.636 (1975).
The stepparent standing in loco parentis similarly invites the intervention of the legal
system only in limited circumstances. People v. Parris, 130 Ill. App. 933, 267 N.E.2d 39
(1971), for example, affirmed the conviction of a stepfather, who stood in loco parentis, under
a statute proscribing willful and unnecessary injury to a child under the defendant's "legal
control." For other purposes as well, including consent to medical treatment, third parties,
including the state, should acknowledge the role of the stepparent who has assumed parenting
responsibilities.
121 Under a derivative model, the stepparent-child relationship is viewed as collateral to,
and dependent upon, the marriage that creates it. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
122 "[T]here are at least eight different legal remedies in California that focus on the same
question: Where and with whom should the child live when something has occurred to disrupt
family unity or balance. " Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings-roblens of
California Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975) (emphasis added); see Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminay, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 226
1975. See generaly H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 572-82 (discussing general jurisdictional bases).
123 In State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594, 264 P. 1069 (1928), the Supreme Court of Kansas
construed the state's divorce statute broadly to confer jurisdiction over stepchildren. See infra
text accompanying notes 136-38. The court also described the equitable jurisdiction of courts
over matters affecting children, in the following manner:
Infants have always been regarded as wards of chancery, and district courts
exercising chancery powers have jurisdiction to protect infants. Such courts
have a broad and comprehensive jurisdiction, and the controlling considera-
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B. Custody Jurisdiction Under "Child of the Marriage" Statutes
A number of state statutes authorize custody orders regarding
"children of the marriage" in dissolution preceedings. 124 To the clear
detriment of the children, parents have successfully resisted stepparent
claims to custody by asserting that the courts lack jurisdiction over
stepchildren under this type of statute.
In Palmer v. Palmer,125 the Supreme Court of Washington construed
a statute conferring jurisdiction over "the custody, support and educa-
tion of the minor children of [the] marriage,"' 126 to exclude jurisdiction
over an extra-marital child born during marriage.12 7 "He is not a child
of the marriage of the parties to this divorce action. The issue of his
custody is beyond the scope of the divorce act and, consequently, be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court in this cause."' 128 The divorce decree
in Palmer had initially incorporated the spouses' agreement to retain
joint custody of the stepchild along with their three children, with the
husband assuming physical custody except during vacation periods.
The divorce court, finding the natural mother unfit, subsequently modi-
fied the decree, granting sole custody to the stepfather and restricting
the mother's right to visit. The appellate court's reversal on jurisdic-
tional grounds resulted in custody of the stepson by the unfit mother,
while his siblings remained with the former husband. The court ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the result, observing that "[w]e do not de-
cide whether or not proper proceedings should be brought to determine
either the propriety of [the mother] as his custodian or her present hus-
band's legal relationship to him."'129 Whatever the result in future pro-
ceedings, if any, the return of custody to the unfit mother was contrary
to the child's welfare, and illustrates the danger inherent in the dissolu-
tion statute's jurisdictional gap.
130
tion of such custody is the best interests of the child. The statute, however,
adds nothing to the power of the court to provide for the custody and welfare
of infants.
125 Kan. at 596, 264 P. at 1070. Other courts, to the contrary, have determined the authority
of the divorce court to be limited by applicable statutes.
124 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.21(A) (Page 1980).
125 42 Wash. 2d 715, 258 P.2d 475 (1953).
126 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961), repealed by 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 157,
§ 30.
127 Palmer, 42 Wash. 2d at 717, 258 P.2d at 476.
128 42 Wash. 2d at 717, 258 P.2d at 476-77.
129 Id. at 718, 258 P.2d at 477.
130 After the Palmer decision, Washington enacted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act. The Court of Appeals of Washington construed the custody provision of the Act to
confer jurisdiction over stepchildren in In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 626 P.2d
16 (1981); see infla text accompanying notes 152-57 (discussing Allen).
A similar custody award to an unfit parent, which would not have been made if the
dissolution court had jurisdiction over stepchildren, almost occurred in Hartshorne v. Harts-
home, 185 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). The dissolution court raised sua sponte the
issue of custody for the wife's children of a prior marriage who had lived in the marital home.
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Morrow v. Morrowl3 follows the pattern of stepchild custody awards
reversed on appeal on jurisdictional grounds.132 The stepfather in Mor-
row had treated the child, born during marriage, as his own and had
sworn to paternity in order to change the child's surname. The dissolu-
tion court relied on these facts to hold that the stepfather was estopped
from denying paternity, thereby making the child "of the marriage."'
33
This estoppel analysis is strained because the theory generally operates
to the detriment of the person whose behavior is at issue. On the merits,
the court granted the stepfather's request for custody. The appellate
court reversed, relying on a literal construction of the statutory "chil-
dren of the marriage" language. The statute expressly extended juris-
diction "to children adopted by both parties and any natural child of
one of the parties who ha[d] been adopted by the other,"' 134 but the
stepchild fell into none of the statutory categories. Although the trial
court was not effective in applying the estoppel doctrine, its desire to
fashion a theory of relief not afforded by the controlling statutes is
understandable. 135
At least one state court has taken a more liberal approach to con-
struing the statutory "children of the marriage" language. In State V.
Taylor 136 the defendant father's removal of his child from the step-
mother, to whom custody had been awarded in an earlier divorce pro-
ceeding, resulted in his conviction for kidnapping. The Supreme Court
of Kansas, in approving the divorce court's exercise of jurisdiction, and
affirming the criminal conviction, held that the stepchild was properly
regarded as a child of the marriage.
In dissolving the marital relation and the breaking up of the home,
Based on a finding of the mother's unfitness, the court ordered their removal to the state
welfare department pending disposition by the juvenile court. On appeal, the Ohio appellate
court held that the lower court lacked authority to make the temporary custody order, be-
cause the stepchildren were not "children of the marriage" under the relevant dissolution
statute. 185 N.E.2d at 330. The Harishome court, however, affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment on the procedural basis that the appellant mother failed to give bond. 185 N.E.2d at
331. Had the mother not committed a procedural error, the court could not have acted to
prevent retention of the children by an unfit parent.
131 165 Conn. 665, 345 A.2d 561 (1974).
132 See, e.g., LaBella v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 316, 57 A.2d 627, 628-29 (1948) ("The
applicable statutes. . . refer to children of the marriage in terms or by implication."); Buzzell
v. Buzzell, 235 A.2d 828 (Me. 1967) (divorce court must resolve whether husband in divorce
proceeding is father of wife's child before it may make orders regarding the child under "chil-
dren of the parties" statute); Phillips v. Phillips, 176 Or. 159, 172, 156 P.2d 199, 203 (1945)
("The children in the case at bar are not 'the children of the marriage' and the [divorce]
statute gives no power to the court to provide for their custody.").
133 165 Conn. at 668, 345 A.2d at 562.
134 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-58 (West Supp. 1984), quoted in 165 Conn. at 668, 345
A.2d at 562.
135 The equitable estoppel theory has been the basis for imposing stepparent support
duties in some cases. See supra text accompanying notes 91-101.
136 125 Kan. 594, 264 P. 1069 (1928).
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the court necessarily took notice of the fact that there was an infant
child in the home for whom provision must be made. . . . As a result
of the marriage the child had been brought into the home, and...
[the wife] assumed its care and stood in loco parentis towards it. We
think the expression in the statute "minor children of the marriage,"
fairly interpreted, included the infant in question, and that the court
had the responsibility and duty to make provision for its custody, care,
and education when the marriage relation was dissolved.'
37
In Taylor, recognition that the stepfamily constitutes a de facto family
led the court to provide a forum to protect the child's interests when its
family broke down.
1 38
C. Visitation Jurisdiction Under "Child of the Marriage" Statutes
The stepparent may seek to continue his or her relationship with
stepchildren following marriage termination by requesting visitation
rights. The term visitation involves rights of physical access, but ex-
cludes the decisionmaking and childrearing responsibilities of legal cus-
tody. As with custody, the statutes in most states provide little guidance
on the issue of jurisdiction to make stepchild visitation orders in divorce
proceedings.
As in the custody area, statutes conferring jurisdiction over "chil-
dren of the marriage" in dissolution proceedings have been construed by
different courts with varied results when the issue is visitation. In Carter
v. Brodrick, 39 the Supreme Court of Alaska broadly construed a statute
authorizing custody and visitation orders regarding "any child of the
marriage" to encompass a stepchild visitation order for the stepfather
who stood in loco parentis during marriage. The California Court of
Appeal's refusal to broadly construe similar "children of the marriage"
language prompted legislation expressly authorizing stepparent visita-
tion awards.
In Perry v. Superior Court,140 the trial court in California awarded the
stepfather visitation rights, in order to protect the interests of the child
with whom the stepfather had lived for six years, since the child was
nine months old. In reversing the visitation order, the Perry court ex-
pressed its dissatisfaction with the result.
We do not find the result in this case particularly palatable. How-
ever, in view of the language in the relevant code sections, we feel
compelled to hold the trial court had no jurisdiction to make any or-
137 Id. at 596, 264 P. at 1070.
138 In Anderson v. Anderson, 191 Kan. 76, 379 P.2d 348 (1963), the Kansas Supreme
Court affirmed a custody award to the stepmother in a divorce proceeding, on the basis of the
father's unfitness. The court relied on Taylor for the proposition that it had jurisdiction over
the child.
139 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982).
140 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980).
1984]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
der concerning visitation in the proceeding before it. We are aware
that in this modern society there are probably a considerable number
of stepparents and stepchildren in situations substantially similar to
that before us. The Legislature has the power to address this thorny
problem of visitation by stepparents. We, on the other hand, cannot
rewrite [the statute] by a strained interpretation of the phrase "minor
children of the marriage."
14'
The California legislature reponded to Perry by unambiguously
conferring jurisdiction to award stepparent visitation in dissolution
proceedings.
[I]n the proceedings under [the code sections dealing with annulment,
marriage dissolution and separation proceedings], the . . . court has
jurisdiction to award reasonable visitation rights to a person who is a
party to the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding with respect
to a minor child of the other party to the marriage, if visitation by
that person is determined to be in the best interests of the minor
child. . . . Any visitation right granted to a stepparent pursuant to
this section shall not conflict with any visitation or custodial right of a
natural or adoptive parent who is not a party to the proceeding.
42
The need for this type of unambiguous statute, addressing custody as
well as visitation, exists in other jurisdictions.
D. Custody Jurisdiction Under the UMDA
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's custody provision has the
same defect as the "child of the marriage" statutes; it does not expressly
address the question of jurisdiction over stepchildren in dissolution pro-
ceedings. Section 401(d) of the Act provides:
A child custody proceeding is commenced in the [-] court:
(1) by a parent, by filing a petition
(i) for dissolution or legal separation; or
(ii) for custody of the child in the [county, judicial district] in
which he is permanently resident or found; or
(2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of
the child in the [county, judicial district] in which he is permanently
141 Id. at 485, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 586. The concurring opinion in Pery showed a willing-
ness to move in the direction of broad construction, by suggesting that an allegation of an in
loco parentis stepparent relationship would have placed the child in the statutory category of
"children of the marriage." Id. at 486, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87 (Hopper, J., concurring). In
a subsequent case, Halpern v. Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 297, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982), the
court of appeal reaffirmed the narrow Pery construction of the "children of marriage" provi-
sion, id at 310, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 747, but concluded that the trial court had properly as-
sumed jurisdiction over a stepchild. The opinion does not state whether the result was based
on both spouses' allegations in their initial pleadings that the stepchild was "of the marriage,"
or rather on the stepfather's allegation of an in loco parentis relationship. See id. at 310, 184
Cal. Rptr. at 747.
142 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4351.5(a), (i) (West 1983).
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resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical custody of one
of his parents.143
The drafters' comment to section 401(d) clarifies the limitations in sub-
section (2) on nonparent-initiated custody jurisdiction.
[S]ubsection (d)(2) makes it clear that if one of the parents has physi-
cal custody of the child, a non-parent may not bring an action to
contest that parent's right to continuing custody under the "best in-
terest of the child" standard of [the Act]. Ifa non-parent. . . wants to
acquire custody, he must commence proceedings under the far more stringent stan-
dars for intervention provided in the typical Juvenile Court Act. 
144
The drafters of the Act imposed the limitations on nonparent standing
to protect the interests of the natural parent.
In short, this subsection has been devised to protect the "parental
rights" of custodial parents and to insure that intrusions upon those
rights will occur only when the care the parent is providing falls short
of the minimum standard imposed by the community at large-the
standard incorporated in the neglect or delinquency definitions of the
state's Juvenile Court Act.'
45
Subsection (d)(2) and the drafters' comment clearly exclude cus-
tody claims by nonparents, outside of the dependency and neglect set-
ting, if a natural parent has physical custody of the child. Several courts
have, however, found authority in the language of the Act or in
nonuniform amendments to the Act to award stepparent custody follow-
ing divorce. 146 In In re Marriage of Tricamo,147 for example, the Colorado
Court of Appeals relied on a nonuniform provision in the Colorado Act
as a basis for stepchild jurisdiction in a marriage dissolution proceeding.
In addition to section 401 (d) (2) of the Uniform Act which applies "only
if the child is not in the physical custody of one of his parents,"' 48 the
Colorado version authorizes proceedings "commenced . . . [b]y a per-
son other than a parent who has had physical custody of a child for a
period of six months or more, if such action is commenced within six
months of the termination of such physical custody."'149 In Ticamo, the
court held that the stepfather, who had shared a household with the
child, "had the physical custody of this child, jointly with his wife, for a
number of years" and satisfied the statutory requirement. 150 Under this
construction, every stepparent who establishes a family home with
143 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d) (1973).
144 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d) commissioners' note (1973) (emphasis
added).
145 Id.
146 See infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
147 42 Colo. App. 493, 599 P.2d 273 (1979).
148 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(b) (1973).
149 Id. § 14-10-123(c).
150 42 Colo. App. at 494-95, 599 P.2d at 274.
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stepchildren may raise the issue of custody following separation. 15 1
In enacting the Uniform Act custody jurisdiction provisions, the
Washington state legislature also expanded subsection (d) (2), by author-
izing nonparent-initiated proceedings "if the child is not in the physical
custody of one of its parents or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a
suitable custodian."' 52 In In re Marriage of Allen, t53 the divorce court relied
on this amendment as the basis for jurisdiction over the husband's child.
In Allen, the stepmother had greatly assisted her deaf stepson in his edu-
cational and social development in a manner that neither natural par-
ent had been able to do. On these facts, the lower court determined that
the father was "unsuitable" and awarded custody to the stepmother.
The Court of Appeals of Washington, apparently unwilling to conclude
that the father was "unsuitable,"'' 54 relied instead upon the uniform lan-
guage of subsection (d)(1) to affirm the award of custody to the step-
mother. The court held that jurisdiction under subsection (d)(1),
dealing with parent-initiated custody jurisdiction in divorce proceed-
ings, 155 extended "to cases involving stepparents where the stepparent
can meet the requirement of standing in loco parentis in a matter of
child custody."'
156
The Allen court's broad construction of "parent" to include steppar-
ents may be inconsistent with the intent of the Uniform Act's drafters to
protect the rights of custodial parents by limiting nonparent-initiated
jurisdiction.157 The assumption of jurisdiction enabling the court to
award custody to the stepmother in Allen, however, was necessary to pro-
tect the child's welfare. In Allen, leaving the determination of custody to
a dependency or neglect proceeding, as suggested in the comments to
the Uniform Act, was not an acceptable result. Reform of the Uniform
Act to clearly authorize jurisdiction in cases like Allen would provide
151 The court in Tricamo could have construed the statute's language narrowly to mean
exclusive, not joint, physical custody by the stepparent. If so interpreted, the section would
have applied only to situations where the stepparent no longer had custody, because in cases
of exclusive stepparent custody at the time of suit, the preceding provision relating to children
not in parental custody would confer jurisdiction.
152 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.180(1)(b) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
'53 28 Wash. App. 637, 626 P.2d 16 (1981).
154 Id. at 642, 626 P.2d at 20.
155 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(1) (1973).
156 28 Wash. App. at 644,626 P.2d at 21. On the merits, the Allen court did not continue
its treatment of the stepparent as a parent. The court rejected the best interests of the child
standard, applicable in conflicts between parents, in favor of a presumption favoring the
natural parent rebuttable only if "the child's growth and development would be detrimen-
tally affected by placement with an otherwise fit parent." Id. at 647, 626 P.2d at 22. On the
facts of Allen, the court concluded that the child would be harmed by removal from the
household with which he was familiar and the care of his dedicated stepmother. The paren-
tal preference used in stepparent versus parent custody cases is discussed infla at text accom-
panying notes 198-215.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
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greater certainty and protection for stepfamily members.1 58
E. Visitation Jurisdiction Under the UMDA
The issue of stepparent visitation rights has arisen in states that
have enacted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The Uniform
Act visitation provision deals exclusively with the rights of natural par-
ents. 159 Courts have stretched the statutory language beyond reason-
able bounds in order to make stepparent visitation awards.
In B an v. Bgan, °60 the Arizona Court of Appeals found statutory
authority to entertain a stepparent request for visitation privileges at the
time of divorce in Uniform Act section 401(d)(1).16 1 Section 401(d)(1)
enables parents to raise custody issues in dissolution proceedings: "A
child custody proceeding is commenced in the [dissolution] court . . .
by a parent, by filing a petition. . . for dissolution."' 162 The court first
held that stepparents may also raise custody issues, provided that the
natural parent initiated the dissolution proceeding. 16 3 The court rea-
soned that such a broad reading of the statute would protect the welfare
158 The Allen court's holding, that stepparents standing in loco parentis are included
under the Uniform Act subsection dealing with parent-initiated dissolution proceedings, has
been criticized as unnecessarily broad. One commentator suggests that the court could have
relied on the narrower nonparent provisions. See Comment,Jurirdiction, Standing, and Decisional
Standards in Parent-Naonparent Custody Dispues-In re Marriage of Allen, 58 WASH. L. REV. 111,
121-24 (1982). Under subsection (2) of the Uniform Act the petition of the nonparent would
confer jurisdiction if the child were not in the physical custody of either parent. Seesupra note
143. The stepmother in Allen stayed in the family home with the children following marital
separation. The court expressly declined to determine whether the father still had physical
custody on these facts. 28 Wash. App. at 645 n.5, 626 P.2d at 21 n.5. Jurisdiction based on
parental unsuitability, the additional ground for nonparent-initiated jurisdiction in the
Washington statute, was apparently foreclosed by the Allen court's statement that the father
was not unsuitable as a parent.
159 "A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights
unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child's
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." UNI. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 407(a)
(1973). In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court construed a
non-Uniform Act provision which provided visitation rights for "parents, grandparents and
other relatives." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953). The court extended the provision to
stepparents choosing to continue an in loco parentis relationship with stepchildren following
marriage termination. 583 P.2d at 68. Absent such a broad construction of the word "par-
ent," the Uniform Act visitation section provides no basis for awarding stepparent visitation
rights.
160 132 Ariz. 353, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
t61 Id at 353, 645 P.2d at 1267.
162 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(1) (1973).
163 It is. . . undisputed that the [natural mother] a "parent" under any reason-
able definition of that term, filed the petition for dissolution that began the
proceeding below. A literal reading of [this provision] would therefore indi-
cate that the [mother], by filing her petition also commenced a child custody
proceeding.
132 Ariz. at 355, 645 P.2d at 1269.
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of stepchildren. 164 This protection, however, only extends to cases in
which the natural parent initiated the action. It is unlikely that the
legislature intended that jurisdiction over stepchildren turn on the pro-
cedural posture of the spouses in the dissolution proceeding.
The Bryan court next extended the scope of custody jurisdiction
under section 401(d) (1) to include the power to grant visitation. Ac-
cording to the court, "[visitation] authority was recognized as an inci-
dent of the expressly granted authority to determine matters of custody
long before the . . . adoption of the present statute."' 65 This construc-
tion ignored the fact that a separate section of the Uniform Act ex-
pressly treats visitation jurisdiction.166 The Ban court's determination,
that the statute authorizing parent-initiated custody proceedings also
confers power to hear stepparent requests for visitation, appears incon-
sistent with the drafters' intent.
In Simpson v. Simpson,167 the Supreme Court of Kentucky similarly
relied upon a custody provision of the Uniform Act as a source of
stepchild visitation jurisdiction. In Snpson, the stepmother had retained
actual custody following separation, and requested legal custody in the
dissolution proceeding. 168 She relied upon the Uniform Act provision
creating custody jurisdiction in suits initiated by nonparents when the
child is not in the physical custody of a natural parent. 69 Because the
stepmother did not plead the father's unfitness, however, her request for
custody failed as a matter of law.' 70 Nevertheless, the court relied upon
the custody provision as a basis for considering the stepmother's request
for visitation. "Where a nonparent alleges such [an in loco parentis]
relationship has been established in ajurisdictionally viable custody action the
court should hold a hearing to determine whether the granting of visita-
tion privileges to the nonparent would be in the best interest of the
child."'17
The dissenting justices in Simpson agreed that "in view of the cir-
cumstances of this case it would be desirable that the stepmother con-
164 The state has a legitimate interest in the welfare of any child whose home is
being divided by its laws, and that interest is equally strong regardless of
whether the marriage being dissolved is that of both, or only one, of the
child's parents. We therefore hold that the proceeding below was a jurisdic-
tionally sound custody proceeding.
Id. at 356, 645 P.2d at 1270.
165 Id. at 357, 645 P.2d at 1271.
166 See UNII. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 407(a) (1973).
167 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979).
168 Id. at 35.
169 Id.; see UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2) (1973).
170 Simpson, 586 S.W.2d at 35; see Chandler v. Chandler, 535 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1975)
(standard for resolving custody disputes between nonparent and natural parent is unfitness of
natural parent).
171 Simpson, 586 S.W.2d at 36 (emphasis added).
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tinue a relationship with the child."' 72 They found no basis in the
statute, however, for reaching this "desirable" result.173 That the Sinp-
son court was forced to engage in judicial legislation in order to protect
the interests of stepfamily members indicates the need for statutory re-
form in this area.1
74
F. Desirability of Jurisdiction in Dissolution Proceedings
Analysis of existing case law reveals two types of judicial responses
to the lack of clear statutory authority to determine stepchild custody
and visitation issues in dissolution proceedings. Some courts have as-
sumed jurisdiction over stepchildren, by ignoring relevant statutes or
construing them very broadly, in some cases beyond the limits of legisla-
tive intent.75 Other courts have exercised restraint and denied jurisdic-
tion. This approach results in custody by the natural parent as a matter
of law, even when that person is unfit.' 76 In addition, this approach
denies all stepparent visitation, even when the child's best interests dic-
tate visitation rights. 177 Some judges taking the strict constructionist ap-
proach have considered the results "unpalatable" or "undesirable," and
have called for legislative reform. 178 Reform of the statutes regulating
marriage dissolution would eliminate the judicial dilemma of choosing
between these two unsatisfactory approaches to the issue of stepchild
jurisdiction.
When children have been living in a de facto family created by
their parent's marriage, meaningful parent-child relationships may exist
with both spouses at the time of marriage termination. Statutes must
recognize this reality and enable courts to protect steprelationships by
awarding custody 179 and visitation rights to stepparents in appropriate
172 Id. at 36 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
173 "There is no statutory provision providing for a separate action for visitation on the
part of a nonparent where a parent has custody." Id. at 38 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
174 Other courts have concluded that authority exists to award stepparent custody and
visitation in dissolution proceedings without referring to statutes or any other source of sub-
ject matterjurisdiciton. See Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75, 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(custody); Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (visitation); Doe v.
Doe, 92 Misc. 2d 184, 192-93, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982-83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (custody); Spells
v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 172-75, 378 A.2d 879, 881-83 (1977) (visitation).
175 See, e.g., Bryan v. Bryan, 132 Ariz. 353, 355-56, 645 P.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (construing statute authorizing parent-initiated custody jurisdiction to include steppar-
ent-initiated visitation jurisdiction); see also supra text accompanying notes 160-66 (discussing
Bqyan).
176 See, e.g., Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 185 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); Palmer v.
Palmer, 42 Wash. 2d 715, 258 P.2d 475 (1953); see also supra text accompanying notes 125-31.
177 See Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 36-39 (Ky. 1979) (Stephenson, J.,dissenting);
see also supra text accompanying notes 172-73 (discussing Perry and Simpson).
178 See Perry v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 485, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586
(1980); Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 39 (Ky. 1979) (Stephenson, J., dissenting); see aso
supra text accompanying notes 140-41, 173 (discussing Perry and Simpson).
179 When the natural parents have shared legal and physical custody of the child during
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80
Legislators should also strive to simplify the law regarding custody
and visitation.' Statutes conferring jurisdiction to decide stepparent
rights in dissolution proceedings are the simplest and most appropriate
means of protecting the interests of stepfamily members following a
family breakdown. In most states, courts are empowered to hear child
custody matters in settings other than marriage dissolution. These set-
tings include guardianship, habeas corpus, and dependency and neglect
proceedings, as well as cases within the courts' general equitable juris-
diction over minor children.' 82 The mere existence of other forums for
deciding stepparent claims, however, does not justify withholding juris-
diction in dissolution proceedings. 83
Allowing stepparent custody claims in dissolution proceedings
would erode the legal rights of natural parents. Although the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act relies upon the doctrine of natural parent
rights to limit nonparent-initiated custody proceedings, 8 4 the principle
is not universally accepted.' 85 Commentators have argued that the best
the stepmarriage, the stepparent seeking custody in the dissolution proceeding will encounter
serious obstacles. An award of exclusive custody would seriously interfere with the custodial
rights of the nonspouse parent, who is not a party to the proceeding, and would therefore be
beyond the power of the court. Furthermore, simply substituting the stepparent for the par-
ent may not be possible. Joint custody arrangements generally succeed only when the joint
custodians cooperate with each other. The stepparent and nonspouse natural parent may not
have a cooperative relationship. These complications argue against allowing stepparent cus-
tody claims when the natural parents share custody, but should not bar the courts from con-
sidering each case on its merits.
180 The authority created by such legislation would be subject to the limitations imposed
by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.CJ.A.) in cases where a judicial order
regarding custody of the stepchild already existed. The U.C.C.J.A. limits the authority of
courts in each state to hear custody cases when courts in another state have already asserted
jurisdiction. U.C.CJ.A. § 13, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1979).
181 Bodenheimer, supra note 122, at 726-34.
182 See H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 576-81; Bodenheimer, supra note 122, at 718-24;
Mnookin, supra note 122, at 232-44.
183 The suggestion made in the commissioner's note to UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 401 (1973), that nonparent interests can be protected in dependency or neglect pro-
ceedings is not realistic. In order to interfere with parental rights under the dependency and
neglect laws, the state generally must satisfy a very strict standard.
Guardianship statutes commonly confer broad jurisdiction over custody issues raised by
persons interested in the child. See 39 CJ.S. Guardian & Ward§§ 21-22 (1976). The steppar-
ent petitioning for guardianship during marriage dissolution may encounter procedural diffi-
culties, however, if different courts have jurisdiction over the two issues.
The habeas corpus proceeding determines whether the person with physical custody of a
child is the legal custodian. H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 578-80. Like the other bases for
custody jurisdiction, however, its limitations make it a poor substitute for raising the issue of
stepchild custody during marriage dissolution. See Comment, Child Custody Modifi ation and the
Family Code, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 725, 729-30 (1975) (discussing 1974 revision of the Texas
Family Code limiting standing in habeas corpus proceedings to persons who have legal right
to custody).
184 See supra text accompanying note 145.
t85 See McGough & Shindell, Coming ofAge: The Best Interests ofthe Child Standard in Parent-
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interests of the child should control custody determinations, and that
the concept of natural parent rights is inconsistent with this principle. 1
8 6
In any event, denying a forum for stepparents to claim custody, in order
to protect the natural parent's rights, operates improperly to create an
absolute preference for natural parents. Their interests are properly ac-
commodated in the divorce setting in the substantive standard enunci-
ated for resolving parent-stepparent custody disputes.1
87
In the visitation setting, the parent stands to lose the right to decide
who will have access to the child. According to some commentators, the
interests of children following family breakdown are best served by pro-
tecting the continuity and integrity of the primary custodial relation-
ship. 188 According to this theory, visitation by other adults should not
be allowed without the consent of the primary custodian. The laws de-
fining visitation rights for noncustodial parents reject this view. Simi-
larly, when a stepparent has stood in loco parentis, the child's interests
require a forum for determining the future relationship between step-
parent and child. The court would consider, inter alia, whether a con-
tinuing relationship might predictably disrupt the child or the primary
custodial relationship. The existence of a forum for stepparent claims
might motivate more parents to voluntarily accommodate stepparent
visits. 189
Where the noncustodial natural parent has visitation rights, the
court must evaluate the effect of a stepparent visitation order on this
additional relationship. Although the dissolution court's order probably
cannot affect the noncustodial parent's rights because he or she is not a
party to the proceeding, the court must consider the rights of the non-
custodial as well as the custodial parent.
The dissent in Simpson v. Simpson expressed concern for the custodial
spouse arising from the fact that the noncustodial natural parent al-
ready had visitation rights.
Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 214 n.24 (1978); Okpaku, Pychology: Impedi-
ment orAid in Child Custody Cases, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1117, 1123 & n.27 (1976).
186 See infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
187 See infra text accompanying notes 198-219.
188 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 116-33 (1979).
189 Another category of nonparents, grandparents, have sought visitation rights. See, e.g.,
Note, Statutoy Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, 26
CATH. U.L. REv. 387 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Statutog Visitation]; Note, Grandpar-
ents-Visitation Rights, 18J. FAM. L. 857 (1979-80). The judicial and legislative trend has been
toward granting courts authority to make grandparent visitation awards, generally according
to the best interests of the child. See Mirto v. Bodine, 29 Conn. Supp. 510, 294 A.2d 336
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Layton v. Foster, 61 N.Y.2d 747, 460 N.E.2d 1351, 472 N.Y.S.2d 916
(1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.400 (Vernon Supp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West




The natural mother of this child already has visitation rights
. . . . [E]ven if the stepmother here would not prevail at a hearing,
the door is wide open. The father conceivably could spend all his
time attending hearings to determine if some other person emotion-
ally attached to the child should have "visitation rights."' 90
The assertion of jurisdiction over visitation claims in Simpson, however,
extends only to persons standing in loco parentis to the child.' 9' Afford-
ing this category of nonparents the right to bring visitation claims may
complicate the life of the custodial parent to some extent. The denial of
jurisdiction over stepchildren, however, protects the custodian's interest
in simplicity at the expense of the stepparent and child.
Judicial discretion to make orders regarding future parenting for
stepchildren, on the basis of all relevant facts and circumstances, will
accommodate the wide variety among modern families. Many families
today are reconstituted families. The proper role of the stepparent fol-
lowing marriage dissolution will not be the same in every case. Flat
rules that disallow continuing access by the stepparent without consent
of the former spouse ignore the child's needs in cases where the relation-
ship is important to the child's welfare. Courts should be empowered to
determine issues of stepchild custody and visitation in dissolution cases.
G. Custody and Visitation Jurisdiction upon Death of Natural
Parent
When death terminates a stepmarriage, the noncustodial natural
parent may seek custody. The parent may request a hearing, pursuant
to the continuing jurisdiction of the original dissolution court, or by
habeas corpus, or in other proceedings. The courts willingly assume ju-
risdiction in these parent-initiated custody proceedings.
It remains uncertain, however, whether courts possess authority to
190 586 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Ky. 1979) (Stephenson, J., dissenting); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 167-74 (discussing Simpson).
191 586 S.W.2d at 36.
Viewing a party in loco parentis as having rights equivalent to a natural
parent. . . reduces the problems that arise if nonparents generally are given
a right to visitation. Nonparent visitation has been criticized because it could
interfere with a custodial parent's control if an abundance of relatives and
close family friends are allowed visitation. By requiring an initial showing
that a nonparent stands in loco parentis many of these claims would be
dismissed.
Note, Visitation for Nonparents: Following the Polestar, 11 STETSON L. REv. 586, 596-97 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
In In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1979), the court recognized that the stepfamily relationship, although extremely
complex, requires the attention and protection of the law. In ordering the adoption of chil-
dren by their stepfather, the court also provided for visitation by the natural father, contrary
to the general rule that adoption totally severs the legal parent-child relationship. Id. at 425-
26, 406 A.2d at 989.
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entertain requests for stepparent visitation when the nonspouse natural
parent seeks custody. In Collins v. Gilbreath,19 2 for example, the Indiana
Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's award of visitation rights to the
stepfather in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by the natural father
ten days after the mother's suicide. The court reasoned that
[t]o abrubtly end this close relationship and deny him the privilege of
ever seeing the girls again would be unfair and traumatic to both [the
stepfather] and the three young girls. The children would in essence
lose their second parent in ten days-one by suicide and one by court
decree. 193
The dissent, however, observed that the Indiana visitation statute men-
tioned only parents and concluded that "[t]he trial court had no statu-
tory or common law authority to award visitation . . . to . . . an
unrelated third party." 194
If the stepparent has retained actual custody following the spouse's
death, access to the courts to determine continuing custody rights is gen-
erally available.195 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for exam-
ple, includes a basis for child custody jurisdiction on the petition of a
nonparent "if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his
parents."196 Whether the marriage terminates by death or divorce,
however, the stepparent encounters the difficult substantive burden of
overcoming a preference for the natural parent.197
H. The Substantive Standard in Custody Cases
If the stepparent overcomes the jurisdictional hurdle, he or she
faces yet another barrier to asserting custody rights upon termination of
the stepmarriage by death or dissolution. As a general principle, cus-
192 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. App. 1980).
193 403 N.E.2d at 923; see also Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978)
(affirming trial court's sua sponte award of visitation rights to stepmother in proceeding
awarding custody to natural mother).
194 403 N.E.2d at 924 (Young, J., dissenting).
195 In Clifford v. Woodford, 83 Ariz. 257, 320 P.2d 452 (1957), the stepfather filed a
petition requesting appointment as guardian of his stepdaughters shortly after the father initi-
ated a habeas corpus proceeding in the same court. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed
the trial court's consolidation of the two proceedings, stating that "[the stepfather] had the
right to have the trial court determine the question of what would be for their best interests and
welfare in this particular litigation. The writ of habeas corpus alone provided adequate legal
mechanism for such determination. However,. . . consolidation resulted in no prejudice to
either party." Id. at 261, 320 P.2d at 455 (emphasis added). The court then affirmed the
stepfather's appointment as guardian. Id. at 262-66, 320 P.2d at 455-58; S( In re Adoption of
Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953) (setting aside adoption ordered without notifi-
cation or consent of stepparent). But cf Selanders v. Anderson, 178 Kan. 664, 291 P.2d 425
(1955) (upholding injunction against adoption petition of forum-shopping stepmother).
196 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 401(d)(2) (1973); see supra text accompanying
note 143.
197 See infia part II.H.
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tody law prefers the natural parent as custodian.1 98 This principle oper-
ates against the stepparent in contests with the natural parent. 199 In
parent versus parent custody disputes, the courts use a "best interests of
the child" standard. 20 0 In parent versus nonparent contests, however,
the preference for the natural parent frequently results in a standard
weighted in favor of the natural parent.
20 1
The weight assigned to the preference for the natural parent varies
depending on the jurisdiction and the facts of the case. 20 2 At one ex-
treme, the presumption in favor of the parent is rebuttable only by prov-
ing unfitness. This test considers the merits of the nonparent only if he
or she establishes the unfitness of the parent.20 3 Some courts give less
weight to the preference by looking primarily to the best interests of the
child but presuming that the child's best interests are served by granting
custody to the natural parent. Under this intermediate standard, the
nonparent must prove that he or she is a more suitable custodian than
the natural parent.20 4 In Husack v. Husack,20 5 for example, the step-
mother prevailed by showing "convincing reasons" why denying cus-
tody to the natural parent would serve the best interests of the child.
20 6
198 See McGough & Shindell, supra note 185, at 212.
199 Stepparents have succeeded in custody battles against other nonparents on the basis of
an established in loco parentis relationship with the child. See, e.g., In re Flasch, 51 N.J. Super.
1, 18-19, 143 A.2d 208, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (stepmother versus grandparent), cert.
denied, 28 N.J. 35, 144 A.2d 736 (1958); Exparte Flynn, 87 N.J. Eq. 413, 416-18, 100 A. 861,
863 (NJ. Ch. 1917) (stepmother versus paternal aunt); In re Snyder's Adoption, 403 Pa. 343,
345-47, 169 A.2d 544, 545-46 (1961) (stepmother's petition for adoption following father's
death approved as being in the child's best interest, in spite of objection by the child's half-
sister).
200 E.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE ACT § 402 (1973); see Cebrzynski v. Cebrzyn-
ski, 63 Ill. App. 3d 66, 72, 379 N.E.2d 713, 717 (1978).
201 Courts have sometimes employed the same parent rights theory in judging nonparent
claims to visitation rights. See Note, Statutoy Visitation, supra note 189, at 387-92. However,
visitation constitutes less of an intrusion on parent rights, and the best interests standard is
frequently used to determine visitation rights of nonparents. E.g., Bryan v. Bryan, 132 Ariz.
353, 645 P.2d 1267 (1982) (child's best interest served by continuation of close relationship
with stepfather through visitation); Chodzko v. Chodzko, 66 Ill. 2d 28, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976)
(in grandparent visitation proceedings, parent's natural rights must give way to child's best
interest); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976) (grandparent visitation).
202 See H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 591-96; Note, Pschological Parents vs. Biological Parents:
The Courts' Response to New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L. 545, 548-
52 (1978-79); Note, Child Custody--Rebutting the Presumption of Parental Preference, 43 Miss. L.J.
247, 247 (1972).
203 See, e.g., Hancock v. Hancock, 198 Ark. 652, 656-57, 130 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1939) (reversing
trial court award of custody to stepmother earlier appointed guardian following father's
death); In re Guardianship of Hight, 194 Okla. 214, 218-19, 148 P.2d 475, 483 (1944) (revers-
ing appointment of stepmother). But see Petition of Stuart, 280 N.Y. 245, 250-51, 20 N.E.2d
741, 743-44 (1939) (reversing Appellate Division denial of stepson's petition for stepfather
guardianship on ground that father was fit).
204 See Note, Alternatives to "Parental Rights" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,
73 YALE L.J. 151, 154-55 (1963-64).
205 273 Pa. Super. 192, 417 A.2d 233 (1979).
206 The trial court had treated the stepmother as a parent, rather than a third party,
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Finally, the court may ignore the fact of biological parenthood in resolv-
ing custody issues.
20 7
Many courts have been ambiguous concerning the proper standard
for resolving custody disputes between parent and stepparent, especially
in situations where natural parent rights and the child's best interests
appear to conflict. In Gonnan v. Gonnan,20 8 for example, a Florida appel-
late court applied the best interests of the child standard, prescribed by
statute for parent versus parent contests, in a stepmarriage dissolution
case.2 0 9 The court simultaneously acknowledged the jurisdiction's pref-
erence for the natural parent, stating that "courts should not lightly en-
croach on the rights of natural parents to have the custody, care and
control of minor children, especially when such parents are found to be
fit. ' ' 2 10 The trial court had found the father to be a fit parent but
awarded custody to the stepmother in order to serve the child's best in-
terests.2 1' According to the Gorman court, "the facts of this case illustrate
that there can be conflicts between what is reasonably perceived by a
trial judge to be in the child's best interests and a natural parent's pref-
erential right to custody of a child. '2 12 Not content with simply balanc-
ing these competing interests in favor of the child, however, the
appellate court observed that "[i]n finding the father a fit and proper
parent the trial judge was charitable. We do not hold the trial judge in
error in making this finding, but everybody needs to be loved and not
rejected .... -2,3 Thus, after adopting the best interests standard of
parent versus parent disputes, the court wavered by acknowledging a
special interest of the parent. The court declined to assign decisional
weight to that special interest, however, when a conflict with the child's
best interests emerged.
The potential for conflict between a natural parent preference and
the best interests of the child, realized by the Corman court, has led some
commentators to reject the preference. 2 14 According to these critics, the
child's welfare must be the guiding principle in decisionmaking for chil-
dren, subordinating all other interests.
21 5
because she had acted as the child's mother during marriage to the father, and awarded her
custody according to the best interests standard. Id at 195 n.4, 417 A.2d at 235 n.4. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Husack concluded that the stepmother passed the stricter test
for nonparents and affirmed the award in her favor. Id. at 197-98, 417 A.2d at 236.
207 See Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 467 A.2d 249, 250 (1983) (awarding joint legal custody
to natural mother and stepfather, and physical custody to stepfather).
208 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
209 Id. at 77.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id at 77-78.
213 Id at 78.
214 H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 592 n.6 (collecting authority).
215 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 188, at 105-11; McGough &
Shindell, supra note 185, at 241-44.
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Most courts, however, continue to assign decisional weight to the
fact of biological parenthood in custody disputes between parent and
nonparent.2 16 When the nonparent is a stepparent who has shared a
family household with the child, the court should carefully weigh the
competing interests. In cases arising upon dissolution of marriage, im-
portant factors will include the quality of the child's relationship with
each adult and the length of time the stepparent and child lived to-
gether.2 17 When the noncustodial parent seeks custody following death
of the stepparent's spouse,218 the additional factor of stability and con-
tinuity of the child's primary relationships may operate to benefit the
stepparent.2 19 The stepparent will succeed if he or she can satisfy the
standard established in the jurisdiction for overcoming the natural par-
ent preference.
CONCLUSION
The existing laws regarding stepfamilies inadequately protect fam-
ily interests. For the most part, the legal response to this increasingly
common alternative to the biological nuclear family has been
inattention.
In the support area, the voluntary common law in loco parentis
doctrine and the limited duty statutes fail to address the variety of fam-
ily contexts in which the question of stepchild support may arise. Laws
requiring the stepparent to share the child support duty of his or her
spouse during marriage would better accommodate the financial inter-
ests of family members. Following marriage termination the derivative
model of the stepparent-child relationship results in automatic termina-
tion of all financial responsibility. The derivative model, widely ac-
cepted by courts and legislatures, ignores the fact that many times
family relationships have economic ramifications for the parties beyond
marriage termination. The need exists for rules enabling the courts to
protect the economic interests of family members in each case after the
stepmarriage ends.
Legislative inattention has generated great ambiguity regarding the
courts' authority to consider future parenting of stepchildren at the time
216 See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
217 Under the strictest fitness test, the only relevant factor is the fitness of the natural
parent.
218 Efforts by the decedent parent to appoint the surviving spouse-stepparent as legal
guardian of the children will generally fail if the other natural parent objects. The intention
of the decedent cannot affect the presumption that the child belongs with the surviving par-
ent. E.g., In re Keyser's Will, 113 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (Sur. Ct. 1951) (unfitness standard); In re
Kosnicki, 468 P.2d 818, 822-23 (Wyo. 1970) (unfitness standard). But see Wilkinson v. Dem-
ing, 80 Ill. 342, 343 (1875) (because "[b]y the [divorce] decree, the infant is no longer the chld
of the divorced father, but is entirely under the control of the mother... ," the mother may
appoint a guardian in her will).
219 See Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 63 Ill. App. 3d 66, 73, 379 N.E.2d 713, 718 (1978).
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of family breakdown. The reported cases illustrate the hardship that
can result from ignoring the needs of stepfamily members. Legal recog-
nition of the complex family network created by steprelationships neces-
sarily complicates the judicial role and the legal issues. Modern families
are more varied and often more complex than in the past. The family
law must not adhere to the simplistic model of the biological nuclear
family in all cases. Lawmakers must clearly establish the courts' juris-
diction over stepfamily members at the time of stepfamily breakdown.
Once jurisdiction is established, a standard must be clearly articu-
lated for resolving the issue of future parenting arrangements for
stepchildren at the time of divorce. Courts should employ in this setting
the general standard for resolving custody disputes between parent and
nonparent. Courts currently resolve conflicts between the noncustodial
parent and stepparent, arising upon death of the custodial parent, ac-
cording to this standard.
Although the law authorizes marriage by parents with children, it
fails to address adequately the significance of family relationships be-
tween stepparents and stepchildren in determining custody, visitation,
and support arrangements. In view of the increasing number of
stepfamilies in the United States, lawmakers must seriously consider
how best to achieve the family law goals of certainty and protection for
stepfamily members.
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